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Date:      Sat, 13 Jan 2001 15:41:44 -0800
From:      Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.ORG>
To:        Cy Schubert - ITSD Open Systems Group <Cy.Schubert@uumail.gov.bc.ca>
Cc:        freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: [!H] Tcpdump 3.5.2 remote root vulnerability (fwd)
Message-ID:  <20010113154144.A2379@citusc.usc.edu>
In-Reply-To: <200101131323.f0DDNX518734@cwsys.cwsent.com>; from Cy.Schubert@uumail.gov.bc.ca on Sat, Jan 13, 2001 at 05:23:22AM -0800
References:  <20010112184529.B25168@citusc.usc.edu> <200101131323.f0DDNX518734@cwsys.cwsent.com>

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On Sat, Jan 13, 2001 at 05:23:22AM -0800, Cy Schubert - ITSD Open Systems G=
roup wrote:

> I do recall the advisory which mainly patches some calls from sprintf()=
=20
> to snprintf(), however the advisory from BUGTRAQ that I had forwarded=20
> to this list patches two calls to sscanf().  Are you saying that we=20
> tackled the same problem differently or did we just fix a different=20
> buffer overrun condition?

I believe it attempts to fix one of the problems we fixed (but does it
incorrectly, by truncating a string to 127 bytes which may
legitimately be up to 2048 bytes long in the real world)

> If this is a different problem, there are two other sscanf's in=20
> print-atalk.c that were not discussed in the advisory that need fixing.

These are not exploitable: they read from /etc/atalk.names which is
root-owned, and even then the buffers are sized such that they can't
be overflowed.

Kris
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