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Date:      Sat, 13 Jan 2001 22:51:24 -0500
From:      Peter Chiu <pccb@yahoo.com>
To:        "Crist J. Clark" <cjclark@reflexnet.net>
Cc:        Frank Tobin <ftobin@uiuc.edu>, cjclark@alum.mit.edu, Dru <genisis@istar.ca>, <security@FreeBSD.ORG>
Subject:   Re[2]: opinions on password policies
Message-ID:  <58623706.20010113225124@ipfw.org>
In-Reply-To: <20010113165021.I97980@rfx-64-6-211-149.users.reflexco>
References:  <Pine.BSF.4.21.0101131321210.89486-100000@genisis> <Pine.BSF.4.31.0101131726030.40290-100000@palanthas.neverending.org> <20010113165021.I97980@rfx-64-6-211-149.users.reflexco>

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Saturday, January 13, 2001, 7:50:21 PM, you wrote:

CJC> On Sat, Jan 13, 2001 at 05:35:51PM -0600, Frank Tobin wrote:
>> While this may not be applicable to your situation, I feel that the best
>> policy is to demand public-key authentication.  The reason for this is to
>> limit the human factor, not demanding the user remember yet another unique
>> password.  If forced to remember another password, most users (including
>> myself) will often re-use a password they use at another place.
>> 
>> If your system is compromised, you do not to help the attackers, who are
>> now likely, get into other accounts the user might have other places
>> because they reused the pasword.  On the flip side, it would be best that
>> if the user was compromised someplace else, it won't help the attackers
>> use the authentication information to get into the victim's account on
>> your system.  Public-key systems prevent this sort of "chain-reaction"
>> account breakage.

CJC> I am not sure I understand your argument here. I your system, how does
CJC> the _user_ authenticate himself? Biometrics? HW token? Smart card?
CJC> Really, no passwords?

I think he means using a public-key pair without a passphrase. I could
be wrong though.

However, if the box that stores the private key is compromised, all
other remote boxes that use that key pair are in danger.




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