Date: Sun, 14 Mar 1999 20:07:28 +1000 From: Peter Jeremy <peter.jeremy@auss2.alcatel.com.au> To: robert+freebsd@cyrus.watson.org Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: ACL's Message-ID: <99Mar14.195521est.40346@border.alcanet.com.au>
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Robert Watson <robert@cyrus.watson.org> wrote: >BTW, I'd really like to get rid of hard links -- they allow users to >retain copies of setuid files after the owner thinks they are deleted. This strikes me as overkill. Why not just change either rm(1) or unlink(2) to remove set[gu]id bits on executables? This would have the same net effect and the behaviour can probably be justified. >I.e., user creates a hard link to /usr/sbin/somesetuidbin to >/usr/tmp/mytemp. Normal users shouldn't have write permission anywhere on a partition containing system binaries - this also removes the problem. (Note that /usr/tmp is accessible only by root under FreeBSD). Peter To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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