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Date:      Sun, 14 Jun 1998 13:48:24 -0700 (PDT)
From:      dima@best.net (Dima Ruban)
To:        njs3@doc.ic.ac.uk (Niall Smart)
Cc:        security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: bsd securelevel patch question
Message-ID:  <199806142048.NAA06480@burka.rdy.com>
In-Reply-To: <E0yl9x3-00077K-00@oak71.doc.ic.ac.uk> from Niall Smart at "Jun 14, 98 11:23:53 am"

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Niall Smart writes:
> On Jun 13, 11:03pm, Dima Ruban wrote:
> Thats arguable, consider this quote from the D&I of 4.4BSD
> 
>    Files marked immutable include those that are frequently the subject
>    of attack by intruders (e.g., login and su).  The append-only flag
>    is typically used for critical system logs.  If an intruder breaks
>    in, he will be unable to cover his tracks.  Although simple in 
>    concept, these two features improve the security of a system
>    dramatically.
> 
> I've already posted the following argument to bugtraq, but I'll repeat
> it again here.
> 
> Why do they advocate protecting login and su if such protection can
> be trivially defeated using the same techniques we demonstrated in
> the attack on inetd?  And why do they claim these features improve the
> security of a system "dramatically" if they can be bypassed so easily?
> 
> What use are securelevels without propagating the immutable flag?

The problem is - your patch doesn't fix anything. It just makes things more
complicated.
Example was already given, but here we go again:
You make text segment of a program that marked immutable being a read-only.
Excellent. In this case you need to make sure that such a process can't
be killed or basically can't receive any signals. And this breaks the
whole idea of signals. Because otherwise, being root, I can easily kill
such a process and start another one with a back door in it.
pid is not an issue - it can be easily faked to be the same as a target
process.

> 
> Niall
> 

-- dima

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