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Date:      Fri, 19 Sep 2003 14:42:02 +0200
From:      "Devon H. O'Dell" <dodell@sitetronics.com>
To:        Mark Murray <markm@freebsd.org>
Cc:        freebsd-security@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: [Fwd: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-03:12.openssh]
Message-ID:  <3F6AF99A.2050607@sitetronics.com>
In-Reply-To: <200309190807.h8J875fq006577@grimreaper.grondar.org>
References:  <200309190807.h8J875fq006577@grimreaper.grondar.org>

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Mark Murray wrote:

>"David G. Andersen" writes:
>  
>
>>   You're mistaken.  /dev/random stops feeding you random bits
>>when it doesn't have enough.  /dev/urandom depletes the entropy
>>pool, but when it starts to run out, it falls back to hashing
>>to generate pseudo-random sequences from the random bits that
>>it can obtain.
>>    
>>
>
>Mostly correct :-).
>
>/dev/urandom (in FreeBSD-4-*) always hashes the pool. It doesn't care
>whether or not entropy has been harvested first, unlike /dev/random
>which requires a positive entropy count before suppying output.
>(This provides a doozy of a DoS, BTW, where "cat /dev/urandom > /dev/null"
>renders /dev/random useless).
>
>M
>--
>Mark Murray
>iumop ap!sdn w,I idlaH
>  
>
Well, I'm glad to have gotten these several comments; I wasn't quite 
sure how it worked. Nice to see that the Yarrow is being used in 5.x :)

--Devon



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