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Date:      Wed, 16 Dec 1998 05:40:35 +1300
From:      Joe Abley <jabley@clear.co.nz>
To:        Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za>
Cc:        Kevin Day <toasty@home.dragondata.com>, freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG, jabley@clear.co.nz
Subject:   Re: modification to exec in the kernel?
Message-ID:  <19981216054035.C27078@clear.co.nz>
In-Reply-To: <199812150644.IAA67338@greenpeace.grondar.za>; from Mark Murray on Tue, Dec 15, 1998 at 08:44:16AM %2B0200
References:  <19981215120357.B11837@clear.co.nz> <199812142331.RAA17203@home.dragondata.com> <19981215124818.A22526@clear.co.nz> <199812150644.IAA67338@greenpeace.grondar.za>

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On Tue, Dec 15, 1998 at 08:44:16AM +0200, Mark Murray wrote:
> Joe Abley wrote:
> > I looked at that; however, remember the users will have chrooted access
> > to their directories, and within the chrooted tree will be /usr and
> > descendants containing controlled binaries (owned by someone else, e.g.
> > "root") like perl, awk, sh, etc.
> 
> Your security model is flawed. A user can do anything she wants
> (justabout) with shellscript and perl. Picking on compiled binaries
> is not going to make you that much safer.

"Just about" - so there are _some_ exploits that would require a user-supplied
binary? So preventing execution of user-supplied binaries does give _some_
safety benefit?

I take your point, though - I was forgetting how much feature bloat there
is in perl.

Why people can't just make do with awk is a little beyond me :)


Joe


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