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Date:      Tue, 10 Dec 1996 14:02:26 +1000
From:      auscert@auscert.org.au
To:        first-teams@first.org
Cc:        auscert@auscert.org.au
Subject:   (PUBLIC RELEASE) AUSCERT Advisory AA-96.19 INN parsecontrol Vulnerability
Message-ID:  <199612100402.OAA13975@amethyst.auscert.org.au>
Resent-Message-ID: <199612100705.XAA00476@precipice.shockwave.com>

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===========================================================================
AA-96.19                        AUSCERT Advisory
			INN parsecontrol Vulnerability
                                10 December 1996

Last Revised: --

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in all
versions of INN (InterNetNews) up to and including 1.5.  This
vulnerability allows intruders to execute arbitrary commands on the news
server by sending a carefully crafted news control message.  These commands
will be executed using the privileges of the user configured to run the INN
software (usually "news").

Information concerning this vulnerability has been widely released.

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.  Description

    All versions of INN (up to and including 1.5) contain a security
    vulnerability.  This vulnerability allows remote users to execute
    arbitrary commands on the news server by sending it a carefully crafted
    news control message.  These commands will be executed using the
    privileges of the user configured to run the INN software (usually
    "news").  This may be further leveraged to gain root access, depending
    on the configuration of the operating system and the INN software.

    As this is a vulnerability based upon the content of the news message,
    it is possible to attack news servers that are located behind firewalls
    and other boundary protection systems if the control message is passed
    through to the server.

    The version of INN running on the system can be determined by
    connecting to the nntp port (119) of the news server:

        % telnet localhost 119
	200 a.b.c InterNetNews server INN 1.5 28-Nov-1996 ready

    Type "quit" to exit.

2.  Impact

    Remote users may be able to execute arbitrary commands on the news
    server with the privileges of the user configured to run the INN
    software (usually "news").

    This may be further leveraged to gain root access depending on the
    configuration of the operating system and the INN software.

3.  Workarounds/Solution

    AUSCERT recommends that news servers running the vulnerable versions
    of INN should limit the possible exploitation of this vulnerability
    by immediately applying the vendor patches listed in Section 3.1.

3.1 Apply Vendor Patches

    James Brister, the current maintainer of INN, has made available
    security patches for common versions of INN that address the
    vulnerability described in this advisory.

    For INN versions 1.4unoff3, 1.4unoff4 and 1.5:

        ftp://ftp.vix.com/pub/inn/patches/security-patch.01

    For INN version 1.4sec:

	ftp://ftp.vix.com/pub/inn/patches/security-patch.02

    The MD5 checksums for these patches are:

        MD5 (security-patch.01) = 06131a3d1f4cf19d7d1e664c10306fa8
	MD5 (security-patch.02) = 3a964ba0b2b2baf678ef554c67bb28f2

    AUSCERT recommends sites running previous versions of INN upgrade to
    the latest version of INN (version 1.5) and then apply
    security-patch.01.

    More information regarding the current release of INN can be found at:

	http://www.isc.org/isc/inn.html

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUSCERT thanks James Brister of the Internet Software Consortium for his
rapid response to this vulnerability.  AUSCERT also acknowledges Matt
Power from MIT for his initial report of the problem.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The AUSCERT team have made every effort to ensure that the information
contained in this document is accurate.  However, the decision to use the
information described is the responsibility of each user or organisation.
The appropriateness of this document for an organisation or individual
system should be considered before application in conjunction with local
policies and procedures.  AUSCERT takes no responsibility for the
consequences of applying the contents of this document.

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AUSCERT or
your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams).

AUSCERT is located at The University of Queensland within the Prentice
Centre.  AUSCERT is a full member of the Forum of Incident Response and
Security Teams (FIRST).

AUSCERT maintains an anonymous FTP service which is found on:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/.  This archive contains past SERT and AUSCERT
Advisories, and other computer security information.

AUSCERT also maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on:
http://www.auscert.org.au/.

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:	(07) 3365 4477
Telephone:	(07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
		AUSCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
		which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
		On call after hours for emergencies.

Postal:
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
c/- Prentice Centre
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld.  4072.
AUSTRALIA


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Revision History


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