Date: Thu, 26 Feb 1998 10:48:26 -0800 (PST) From: dima@best.net (Dima Ruban) To: tqbf@secnet.com Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG, commiters@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: OpenBSD Security Advisory: mmap() Problem Message-ID: <199802261848.KAA06539@burka.rdy.com> In-Reply-To: <19980226174359.3210.qmail@joshua.enteract.com> from "tqbf@secnet.com" at "Feb 26, 98 11:43:59 am"
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Is there anybody who's gonna review and commit this?
tqbf@secnet.com writes:
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> OpenBSD Security Advisory
>
> February 20, 1998
>
> 4.4BSD mmap() Vulnerability
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> SYNOPSIS
>
> Due to a 4.4BSD VM system problem, it is possible to memory-map a
> read-only descriptor to a character device in read-write mode. This
> allows group "kmem" programs to become root, and root to lower the
> system securelevel, both by writing to the kernel memory device.
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> AFFECTED SYSTEMS
>
> This vulnerability has been confirmed against OpenBSD 2.2 (and below),
> FreeBSD 2.2.5 (and below), and BSDI 3.0. NetBSD-current (without UVM)
> and below is also affected.
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> DETAILS
>
> The 4.4BSD VM system allows files to be "memory mapped", which causes
> the specified contents of a file to be made available to a process via
> its address space. Manipulations of that file can then be performed
> simply by manipulating memory, rather than using filesystem I/O calls.
> This technique is used to simplify code, speed up access to files, and
> provide interprocess communication.
>
> Memory mappings can be "private" or "shared". In a private memory mapping,
> changes to the mapped memory are not committed back to the original file.
> Multiple processes with private mappings of the same file will not see
> each other's changes. In a shared mapping, changes to the mapped memory
> are reflected in the original file, and all processes mapping the same
> file see each others's changes.
>
> In order to create a writeable mapping for a file descriptor, that file
> descriptor must be open in read-write mode. This prevents users from using
> read-only access to system files to change the system configuration (by
> taking the read-only descriptors and mapping them read-write). The 4.4BSD
> VM system verifies that an open file descriptor is read-write before
> allowing a shared read-write mapping.
>
> 4.4BSD does not perform this access check when the mapping is not shared;
> a process with a private mapping cannot modify the original file, so the
> potential for danger is minimized. Unfortunately, the 4.4BSD VM system
> automatically changes any private mapping of a character device to
> "shared", regardless of the flags passed to mmap(), after the access check
> is performed.
>
> This allows a user with read-only access to a character device to create a
> read-write mapping to that device, and thus write to the device. This can
> be used against the raw memory device ("/dev/mem") to write arbitrary
> bytes directly to physical memory; if a process has read-only access to
> "/dev/mem" (processes in group "kmem" have this access), it can become
> "root" by altering kernel data structures.
>
> Furthermore, a process with a read-write mapping on "/dev/mem" can rewrite
> the system securelevel back to zero after it has been raised. This allows
> an attacker to bypass the "immutable" and "append-only" filesystem flags,
> along with any other securelevel protections.
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> TECHNICAL DETAILS
>
> The code exhibiting this problem is located in "sys/vm/vm_mmap.c", in the
> functions "mmap()" (the mmap system call handler), and "vm_mmap()", the VM
> function that actually performs memory mapping. The problem is due to a
> faulty access check in mmap(), combined with a side-effect of character
> device mapping in vm_mmap().
>
> The mmap() system call handler performs a read-write access check by
> examining the file descriptor passed in as an argument to the system call.
> Before allowing a shared read-write mapping, the system verifies that the
> file being mapped is open in write mode:
>
> if (flags & MAP_SHARED) {
> if (fp->f_flag & FWRITE)
> maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
> else if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
> return (EACCES);
> }
>
> If the requested mapping is not shared, the access check against the
> file (the check for FWRITE in fp->f_flag, which is the file structure
> for the descriptor passed to mmap) is not performed. For regular files,
> this check is sufficient; a non-shared mapping will not allow a process
> to write to the actual file, only to a private copy in memory.
>
> The vm_mmap() kernel VM function handles memory mapping for all of the
> kernel facilities that require this capability, including execve(),
> System V shared memory, and the mmap() system call. vm_mmap() checks
> to see if a mapping is requested is associated with a character device,
> and, if so, automatically creates a shared mapping (comments from original
> source code):
>
> if (vp->v_type == VCHR) {
> type = OBJT_DEVICE;
> handle = (caddr_t) vp->v_rdev;
> }
>
> ...
>
> /*
> * Force device mappings to be shared.
> */
> if (type == OBJT_DEVICE) {
> flags &= ~(MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_COPY);
> flags |= MAP_SHARED;
> }
>
> As a result of this code, it is possible to request a non-shared mapping
> of a character device (which will appear innocuous to the mmap() access
> checking code), and receive a shared, writeable mapping. This can be used
> to obtain write access to any readable character device.
>
> This problem is particularly serious when a hostile process has read
> access to kernel memory devices. The system status utilities "ps",
> "netstat", "systat", and others operate setgid "kmem", allowing them to
> use the KVM library to directly access kernel memory. A bug in any of
> these programs can allow an attacker to trivially obtain root access, by
> mmap()'ing a read-only descriptor to "/dev/mem" and altering process
> credential structures.
>
> This issue also directly subverts the system securelevel. 4.4BSD has a
> facility called "securelevels" which adds restrictions to the kernel that
> take effect only when a flag in the kernel (the "securelevel") is set.
> These restrictions include "immutable" files, which cannot be altered
> (even by root), and "append-only" files, which can only have data appended
> to. The former is useful for system binaries (to prevent attackers from
> backdooring libraries and executables), and the latter is useful for logs
> (to prevent attackers from covering their tracks by deleting log data).
>
> The 4.4BSD securelevel features are active when the securelevel is
> nonzero. The securelevel is set using the "sysctl" facility. The system
> does not allow the securelevel to be lowered once it is nonzero; if
> an attacker can lower the securelevel, she can evade securelevels
> protections by turning them off.
>
> The 4.4BSD kernel does not allow processes to write directly to kernel
> memory when the securelevel is nonzero; this prevents "root" from
> bypassing the securelevel simply by writing to "/dev/kmem". This is
> controlled by an access check in "sys/miscfs/specfs/spec_vnops.c", which
> provides vnode operations (open, read, write, etc) for special files (like
> character devices).
>
> The access check is performed in the "spec_open()" function, which handles
> the "open" system call for special files. When the securelevel is nonzero,
> the system explicitly checks for attempts to open devices in read-write
> mode, and prevents read-write opens for disk and kernel memory devices.
>
> Unfortunately, the mmap() bug allows a process to write to a descriptor
> even if it is open read-only; the assumption made in spec_open() thus
> fails to catch attempts to reset the securelevel using mmap().
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> RESOLUTION
>
> This is a kernel problem that can only be fixed by patching or upgrading
> the problematic system code. Patches for the OpenBSD operating system are
> provided in this advisory. The problem is fixed in OpenBSD-current and
> must be patched in versions 2.2 and below.
>
> The attached OpenBSD patch causes any attempt to create a private mapping
> of a character device to fail, and enhances access checking in mmap() to
> explicitly verify that the mapping requested is consistant with the open
> mode on the file descriptor being mapped.
>
> Accelerated X from X Inside relies on this bug to operate correctly; this
> patch thus breaks the Accelerated X server. Contact your Accelerated X
> vendor for more information about this. XFree86 is not believed to be
> affected by the problem.
>
> More information about the OpenBSD resolution to the problem is available
> at "http://www.openbsd.org/errata.html".
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> CREDITS
>
> Documentation and testing of this problem was conducted by Theo de Raadt
> and Chuck Cranor. Theo de Raadt, Chuck Cranor, and Niklas Hallqvist of the
> OpenBSD project provided the OpenBSD patch for the problem.
>
> The developers at OpenBSD would like to extend their gratitude to Perry
> "Scare Bear" Metzger for his continued support of their efforts.
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> OPENBSD PATCH
>
> Index: vm_mmap.c
> ===================================================================
> RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/vm/vm_mmap.c,v
> retrieving revision 1.10
> retrieving revision 1.13
> diff -u -9 -u -r1.10 -r1.13
> --- vm_mmap.c 1997/11/14 20:56:08 1.10
> +++ vm_mmap.c 1998/02/25 22:13:46 1.13
> @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
> -/* $OpenBSD: vm_mmap.c,v 1.10 1997/11/14 20:56:08 deraadt Exp $ */
> +/* $OpenBSD: vm_mmap.c,v 1.13 1998/02/25 22:13:46 deraadt Exp $ */
> /* $NetBSD: vm_mmap.c,v 1.47 1996/03/16 23:15:23 christos Exp $ */
>
> /*
> * Copyright (c) 1988 University of Utah.
> * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
> * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
> *
> * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
> * the Systems Programming Group of the University of Utah Computer
> @@ -207,48 +207,60 @@
> * Mapping file, get fp for validation.
> * Obtain vnode and make sure it is of appropriate type.
> */
> if (((unsigned)fd) >= fdp->fd_nfiles ||
> (fp = fdp->fd_ofiles[fd]) == NULL)
> return (EBADF);
> if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE)
> return (EINVAL);
> vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
> - if (vp->v_type != VREG && vp->v_type != VCHR)
> - return (EINVAL);
> +
> /*
> * XXX hack to handle use of /dev/zero to map anon
> * memory (ala SunOS).
> */
> if (vp->v_type == VCHR && iszerodev(vp->v_rdev)) {
> flags |= MAP_ANON;
> goto is_anon;
> }
> +
> + /*
> + * Only files and cdevs are mappable, and cdevs does not
> + * provide private mappings of any kind.
> + */
> + if (vp->v_type != VREG &&
> + (vp->v_type != VCHR || (flags & (MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_COPY))))
> + return (EINVAL);
> /*
> * Ensure that file and memory protections are
> * compatible. Note that we only worry about
> * writability if mapping is shared; in this case,
> * current and max prot are dictated by the open file.
> * XXX use the vnode instead? Problem is: what
> * credentials do we use for determination?
> * What if proc does a setuid?
> */
> maxprot = VM_PROT_EXECUTE; /* ??? */
> if (fp->f_flag & FREAD)
> maxprot |= VM_PROT_READ;
> else if (prot & PROT_READ)
> + return (EACCES);
> +
> + /*
> + * If we are sharing potential changes (either via MAP_SHARED
> + * or via the implicit sharing of character device mappings),
> + * and we are trying to get write permission although we
> + * opened it without asking for it, bail out.
> + */
> + if (((flags & MAP_SHARED) != 0 || vp->v_type == VCHR) &&
> + (fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0 && (prot & PROT_WRITE) != 0)
> return (EACCES);
> - if (flags & MAP_SHARED) {
> - if (fp->f_flag & FWRITE)
> - maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
> - else if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
> - return (EACCES);
> - } else
> + else
> maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE;
> handle = (caddr_t)vp;
> } else {
> /*
> * (flags & MAP_ANON) == TRUE
> * Mapping blank space is trivial.
> */
> if (fd != -1)
> return (EINVAL);
>
>
>
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