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Date:      Fri, 21 Jul 2000 13:51:05 -0400
From:      "Thomas R. Stromberg" <tstromberg@rtci.com>
To:        Robert Watson <rwatson@freebsd.org>, freebsd-security@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: Status of FreeBSD security work? Audit, regression and crypto swap?
Message-ID:  <39788D89.56359DCA@rtci.com>
References:  <Pine.NEB.3.96L.1000719165025.73365A-100000@fledge.watson.org>

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Robert Watson wrote:
> Personally, my big fear is my notebook computer.  I can encrypt data on it
> using command line tools, but I'd much rather see a device layer that I
> can use to protect both swap and sensitive partitions.  Swap could use a
> randomized key, and mounting of data partitions could rely on a
> user-provided key for the device layer.  A crypto-fs might be more fun,
> but if we have the facility to layer device access, we might as well use
> that for a quicky solution.  It's easy for someone to walk off with
> personal computing devices -- in the office, at home, at the airport, ...
>
>   Robert N M Watson

At work we've had great success using cfs (cryptographic filesystem) for
sensitive data. As a "oops I forgot" or "oops the sysadmin is dead"
precaution, we store all root, router, and sql passwords on a relatively
unmarked disk. This of course is held in a secure area, in a fireproof
box,
and the password is only passed via word of mouth.

Due to the complexity of getting cfs setup for a junior admin, we've
scripted it all out with a cute ansified menu in perl. This automated
script
also keeps on-disk diffs of all changes, a log of all activities, and
syslogs
out upon insertion. This of course just weeds out novices who get their
hands on the disk.

There are three great advantages to using cfs on floppies:

1) Idle timeouts and time limits. If someone idles on the disk for 10
minutes, cfs can
unmount itself. This is a godsend feature.

2) If you put it in a Windows box, it appears unformatted. Great for
wannabe hackers and managers alike. They have to know its UFS.

3) Forces the user to be on a machine that he has root on, and that can
mount cfs. Aka, it forces us to deploy FreeBSD boxes on the desktop.

Ive also messed around with storing my home directory in cfs, until I
forgot
its password :( Of course, there is nothing stopping anyone from using
pgp
for important documents, but this can get unwieldly.


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-- 
thomas r. stromberg                :               tstromberg@rtci.com
senior systems administrator       :      http://www.afterthought.org/
research triangle commerce, inc.   :                    1.919.657.1317


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