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Date:      Mon, 24 Jun 1996 10:19:22 -0700 (MST)
From:      Terry Lambert <terry@lambert.org>
To:        narvi@haldjas.folklore.ee (Narvi)
Cc:        terry@lambert.org, jkh@time.cdrom.com, guido@gvr.win.tue.nl, hackers@FreeBSD.ORG, security@FreeBSD.ORG, ache@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: I need help on this one - please help me track this guy down!
Message-ID:  <199606241719.KAA28491@phaeton.artisoft.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.3.91.960624195743.25097C-100000@haldjas.folklore.ee> from "Narvi" at Jun 24, 96 08:05:05 pm

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> Now are there some more things someone who's  system was breaked into
> could look for? Perhaps some passwords should be switched to S/Key - 
> it should be possible to generate them on a remote machine and then
> install?

SUID/SGID programs.  Permission changes on devices.  Compiler changes.
Changes to ld.so.  Kernel modules that weren't there before.  RC file
changes.

The list is endless, which is why you reinstall.  You can trust
every binary from the distribution media.

When the 414's broke into a machine I was administering, it got
reinstalled, period.  Using security logs (which you have to have
in place before the fact), we were able to trace back to the
original MAC address ... to a specific machine in a specific
lab on a college campus, with the cooperation of the terminal
server there.  The same loose security that let him hack from
there let us locate him.  Within 8 hours, the system was fully
firewalled and back on line (with all attempt logging active).


The most stupid thing I have ever seen someone do was asserting
"we're smarter than them; we're going to let them come in, and we'll
catch them red handed".  Then they decided to establish a secure
zone and expand it, instead of cutting off the net access and
establishing a switchable zone.  This rendered the computers of
a large number of engineers useless for a relatively long period
of time... the net effect was about $1.2M in costs for idle
engineering time plus facility costs.

If you have a problem system, dike it out of your network.  If you
have a problem terminal server, take it off line and fix it.  If you
have a problem office, deny it access to the corporate net until
the problem is resolved.  A couple of plane tickets and some hotel
bills to get your experts on site is a hell of a lot less expensive
and more effective than trying to run an uncooperative hacker by
wire in an ill-thought attempt to demonstrate your own brilliance.

Further discussion should probably go to "chat" or "security".


					Terry Lambert
					terry@lambert.org
---
Any opinions in this posting are my own and not those of my present
or previous employers.



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