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Date:      Wed, 17 May 2000 11:40:51 -0600
From:      Wes Peters <wes@softweyr.com>
To:        Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>
Cc:        Darren Reed <darrenr@reed.wattle.id.au>, Peter Wemm <peter@netplex.com.au>, committers@FreeBSD.org, security@FreeBSD.org
Subject:   Re: HEADS UP: New host key for freefall!
Message-ID:  <3922D9A3.9EEC6033@softweyr.com>
References:  <Pine.NEB.3.96L.1000517091336.20229A-100000@fledge.watson.org>

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Robert Watson wrote:
> 
> [previous material elided because we're in violent agreement]
> 
> Now to address Wes's point: I don't believe SSH1 can do certification,
> although I don't know about SSH2. 

Oh, I was referrering to certificates for sending S/MIME email.

> At TIS, we have a DNSsec adaptation to
> store host keys in DNS securely, but the secure resolver for BIND9 wasn't
> done last I checked, meaning that an SSH client cannot automatically
> retrieve and verify the host key using DNSsec yet.  DNSsec would really be
> an ideal way to distribute host keys for SSH, so I'll push on appropriate
> parties to see if we can finish it up some time soon (really depends on
> the Nominum/ISC folks).

We'll await news from you.

> I do agree that we need to do a CA, but as I've mentioned before, we need
> to do it *right* or not at all.  This means a secure key storage
> mechanism/facility, offline signing key, etc, etc.  Rather than grow our
> own, it might be easier (and more affordable) to sit on someone else's,
> unless BSDi has one already?  Does anyone know anything about
> inter-cert-format certification?  I.e., can an x.509 PKI root sign PGP
> keys in a useful way?  Is it usefully verifiable in an automated way?

Not that I know of, unless you count sending the PGP keys in an S/MIME
message.  I suspect that might be adequate for our needs, but will defer
to the expertise of our resident crypto-heads.  My security expertise
runs more towards system configuration and protocol design.

> OpenSSL can handle CA behavior, but there are presumably commercial
> products that can do a much better job in terms to handling key splitting,
> etc.  Some comparison shopping and communication

I'm not sure we'll be doing a large enough volume to warrant paying money
for CA services.  I guess we'd have to work out a plan for what classes
of persons and/or positions we plan to issue keys/certs to in order to
answer that question.  If we're talking about a CA cert, a cert for each
of the "hats", and a cert for each committer individually, that means
right now we'd need to manage about 210 certs, of which 5 or 6 need to 
be transferrable.

Plus, I really like the idea of a cert with "The FreeBSD Project" as the
CA.  Are we not the most reliable source of information about FreeBSD?

Replies directed to -security, as this has grown out of the scope of
committers.  (And because I don't want Sheldon to yell again.  ;^)

-- 
            "Where am I, and what am I doing in this handbasket?"

Wes Peters                                                         Softweyr LLC
wes@softweyr.com                                           http://softweyr.com/


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