Date: Tue, 26 Nov 1996 14:34:46 -0600 (CST) From: "Thomas H. Ptacek" <tqbf@enteract.com> To: security@FreeBSD.org Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-96:18.lpr (fwd) Message-ID: <199611262034.OAA14366@enteract.com>
next in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
----- Forwarded message from The Nocturnal Prince -----
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-96:18 Security Advisory
FreeBSD, Inc.
Topic: Buffer overflow in lpr
Category: core
Module: lpr
Announced: 1996-11-25
Affects: FreeBSD 2.*
Corrected: FreeBSD-current as of 1996/10/27
FreeBSD-stable as of 1996/11/01
FreeBSD only: no
Patches: ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/patches/SA-96:18/
=============================================================================
---- End Forward
Question. This was problem-reported over a month ago, and triggered
discussions on the FreeBSD-security list and on bugtraq. I'm curious as to
why it wasn't publicized immediately. Furthermore, I'm interested in
learning more about the FreeBSD team's policy on security advisories
in general, as several issues have been brought up in problem-report
format that have yet to receive 'public' acknowledgement.
For the record, these issues include the immediately exploitable
'route(1)' overflows, the chroot(2) vulnerability, and the reverse lookup
overflow in traceroute(1). I also don't recall ever seeing a release
regarding modstat(1)'s argv[2] overflow.
It would appear that problem-reports are not the optimal way to deal with
security issues in FreeBSD. If this is the case, can you recommend a
better mechanism for bringing these problems to the attention of
developers and users?
Thank you.
----------------
Thomas Ptacek at EnterAct, L.L.C., Chicago, IL [tqbf@enteract.com]
----------------
exit(main(kfp->kargc, argv, environ));
Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?199611262034.OAA14366>