Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Wed, 04 Dec 2002 02:05:15 -0800
From:      Terry Lambert <tlambert2@mindspring.com>
To:        Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
Cc:        wacky@ns1.vrx.net, hackers@freebsd.org, net@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: jail: multiple ip's
Message-ID:  <3DEDD35B.A1E7638E@mindspring.com>
References:  <E18JVwz-0003Hh-00@chiark.greenend.org.uk>

next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
Note: Cross-post and "Reply-To:" of freebsd-net!

Tony Finch wrote:
> wacky@ns1.vrx.net (Mike Ghunt) wrote:
> >  Has anyone hacked the jail code to support more than one ip?
> >Would it be wise to hack at the code to add such a feature?
> 
> Probably the best way to address this issue is to incorporate the
> network stack virtualization patch, then change the jail ID from
> an IPv4 address into a network stack ID.

I'm really tempted to say that the network virtualization patch
is special purpose, and introduces a lot of overhead that would
not be there without the network virtualization patch.

It's the type of thing, IMO, that should be possible for an
experimenter, but not integrated into the FreeBSD kernel itself.

I'm also alarmed at the mbuf header bloat, in general, for some
very specific and not very common uses, including the pushing up
of the full Ethernet packet.  The only use I can see for that
particular trick is supporting VIPs on cards in promiscuous mode,
which normally would not support VIPs (e.g. the Intele Gigabit
ethernet car supports 16 of them) and did not support abusing the
multicast mask to obtain VIPs (e.g. the FXP driver method).

Finally, with the integration of the IPSEC stuff from OpenBSD that
Sam Leffler has been doing, I worry that the IPSEC implementation
is not going to be fixed.  Specifically, the IPSEC data is cloned
per socket opened in IPv4, if IPSEC is in the kernel at all, and
it bloats the per connection memory cost considerably, even if the
IPSEC is never used, or the security association never varies from
the default.

It's all well and good to have an IPSEC axe to grind (8-)) relative
to the SSL stuff, but it's not a good idea to grind it against
people's memory footprint unnecessarily.

Note that Sam did not introduce this problem, KAME did, with the
poor IPSEC integration into IPv4 (it looks very much like an
afterthought), but his addition to the code perpetuates it.

There are some things it's important to integrate/fix so that they
are always there, there are some things which should be optioned,
and there are some things which should remain in academia, until
they are standardized, forcing them on everyone.

-- Terry

To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org
with "unsubscribe freebsd-hackers" in the body of the message




Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?3DEDD35B.A1E7638E>