Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 14:29:57 -0400 (EDT) From: Joe Traister <traister@mojozone.org> To: FreeBSD-gnats-submit@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: bin/4116: kerberized login as <user>.root fails Message-ID: <199707181829.OAA00561@manta.mojozone.org> Resent-Message-ID: <199707181840.LAA08918@hub.freebsd.org>
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>Number: 4116
>Category: bin
>Synopsis: Kerberized login as <user>.root fails to become root
>Confidential: no
>Severity: non-critical
>Priority: low
>Responsible: freebsd-bugs
>State: open
>Class: sw-bug
>Submitter-Id: current-users
>Arrival-Date: Fri Jul 18 11:40:03 PDT 1997
>Last-Modified:
>Originator: Joe Traister
>Organization:
None
>Release: FreeBSD 2.2.2-RELEASE i386
>Environment:
Kerberos installed, configured and running.
>Description:
When logging in as <user>.root principle, the login is subjected
to the same tty tests as root, allowed to login when /etc/nologin
exists, the kerberos ticket file is created as /tmp/tkt_root_<uid>,
and a root login is syslog'ed, but you don't become root. This
is a problem only when LOGIN_CAP is defined during compile. The
non-LOGIN_CAP code does everything as the user and then does the
final setuid() to 0 if it's a root login, but the LOGIN_CAP code
simply does a setusercontext() to the user. This is fixed very
simply by including a check for rootlogin and passing setuserconext
a 0 uid instead of the user's uid.
>How-To-Repeat:
login as a <user>.root principle on a kerberized box.
>Fix:
change
if (setusercontext(lc, pwd, pwd->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETALL) != 0 {
to
if (setusercontext(lc, pwd, rootlogin ? 0 : pwd->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETALL) != 0 {
in login.c in the main() function.
>Audit-Trail:
>Unformatted:
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