Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2005 18:36:20 +0100 From: Anthony Atkielski <atkielski.anthony@wanadoo.fr> To: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Clock slew vulnerability in FreeBSD? Message-ID: <524507450.20050311183620@wanadoo.fr> In-Reply-To: <56f756c499c68c62c6706fef0e896cb2@chrononomicon.com> References: <751280160.20050311034539@wanadoo.fr> <1735368246.20050311044408@wanadoo.fr> <56f756c499c68c62c6706fef0e896cb2@chrononomicon.com>
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Bart Silverstrim writes: > Wouldn't the skew resolution necessary for this tracking technique > become useless with temperature variations, humidity, etc. that can > affect most systems over the course of the day/week/year? That's one of my questions, too. A technique that could identify 100 million different computers (as some people have speculated) would need reliable precision to at least nine decimal places. That's a pretty tall order for something like measurement of clock slewing in TCP packets. There are other related problems. So you identify computer A using its unique clock slew. How do you prove that in court? If you move the machine, or if you change anything about it, the RTC is likely to vary a bit, changing the slew to a different value. Just temperature variations in the room can do that. -- Anthony
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