Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Thu, 13 Dec 2001 10:11:33 +0200
From:      Yonatan Bokovza <Yonatan@xpert.com>
To:        "'security@freebsd.org'" <security@freebsd.org>
Subject:   RE: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-01:66.thttpd
Message-ID:  <EB513E68D3F5D41191CA000255588101B43682@mailserv.xpert.com>

next in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
You forgot the usual paragraph:
The thttpd port is not installed by default, nor is it "part of
FreeBSD" as such: it is part of the FreeBSD ports collection, which
contains over 6000 third-party applications in a ready-to-install
format. The ports collection shipped with FreeBSD 4.4 contains this
problem since it was discovered after the release.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: FreeBSD Security Advisories 
> [mailto:security-advisories@freebsd.org]
> Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2001 19:01
> To: FreeBSD Security Advisories
> Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-01:66.thttpd
> 
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> ==============================================================
> ===============
> FreeBSD-SA-01:66                                            
> Security Advisory
>                                                               
>   FreeBSD, Inc.
> 
> Topic:          thttpd port contains remotely vulnerability
> 
> Category:       ports
> Module:         thttpd
> Announced:      2001-12-11
> Credits:        GOBBLES SECURITY
> Affects:        Ports collection prior to the correction date
> Corrected:      2001-11-22 00:10:56 UTC
> FreeBSD only:   no
> 
> I.   Background
> 
> thttpd is a simple, small, portable, fast, and secure HTTP server.
> 
> II.  Problem Description
> 
> In auth_check(), there is an off-by-one error in computing the amount
> of memory needed for storing a NUL terminated string.  Specifically, a
> stack buffer of 500 bytes is used to store a string of up to 501 bytes
> including the terminating NUL.
> 
> III. Impact
> 
> Due to the location of the affected buffer on the stack, this bug
> can be exploited using ``The poisoned NUL byte'' technique (see
> references).  A remote attacker can hijack the thttpd process,
> obtaining whatever privileges it has.  By default, the thttpd process
> runs as user `nobody'.
> 
> IV.  Workaround
> 
> 1) Deinstall the thttpd port/package if you have it installed.
> 
> V.   Solution
> 
> 1) Upgrade your entire ports collection and rebuild the port.
> 
> 2) Deinstall the old package and install a new package dated after the
> correction date, obtained from the following directories:
> 
> [i386]
> ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable
/www/thttpd-2.22.tgz
> ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-curren
t/www/thttpd-2.22.tgz

[alpha]
Packages are not automatically generated for the alpha architecture at
this time due to lack of build resources.

3) Download a new port skeleton for the thttpd port from:

http://www.freebsd.org/ports/

and use it to rebuild the port.

4) Use the portcheckout utility to automate option (3) above. The
portcheckout port is available in /usr/ports/devel/portcheckout or the
package can be obtained from:

ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/devel/portche
ckout-2.0.tgz
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/devel/portch
eckout-2.0.tgz

VI.  Correction details

The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in the FreeBSD ports collection.

Path                                                             Revision
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
ports/www/thttpd/Makefile                                            1.23
ports/www/thttpd/distinfo                                            1.20
ports/www/thttpd/files/patch-fdwatch.c                            removed
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII. References

<URL:http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/241310>;
<URL:http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/10884>;
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: http://www.nectar.cc/pgp

iQCVAwUBPBY6x1UuHi5z0oilAQEHrgQAgscqPT0AVJcotWgO1t8WuJQyNukLHnDS
qGa8LT7ebuMY/Nl6JJzTYudwmr16RtJNPSYTfk1eHPWgAYzKyiNM7uMU87ZDplpM
FOggQbjdhFPNUE3WK8P2cmdm+7mrZbdWGJmvZpYH4TRNn6yQVV4F8tENl+nPu3I+
5IGxGqgr2vA=
=1MCH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

This is the moderated mailing list freebsd-announce.
The list contains announcements of new FreeBSD capabilities,
important events and project milestones.
See also the FreeBSD Web pages at http://www.freebsd.org


To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org
with "unsubscribe freebsd-announce" in the body of the message

To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org
with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message




Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?EB513E68D3F5D41191CA000255588101B43682>