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Date:      Wed, 18 Nov 1998 10:25:15 +0100
From:      Andre Albsmeier <andre.albsmeier@mchp.siemens.de>
To:        Peter Jeremy <peter.jeremy@auss2.alcatel.com.au>, security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Would this make FreeBSD more secure?
Message-ID:  <19981118102515.A1623@internal>
In-Reply-To: <98Nov18.075152est.40335@border.alcanet.com.au>; from Peter Jeremy on Wed, Nov 18, 1998 at 07:52:13AM %2B1100
References:  <98Nov18.075152est.40335@border.alcanet.com.au>

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On Wed, 18-Nov-1998 at 07:52:13 +1100, Peter Jeremy wrote:
> Andre Albsmeier <andre.albsmeier@mchp.siemens.de> wrote:
> >I just was alarmed by xlockmore that a program runs setuid root all the time
> >only to check the password the user enters.
> In the case of xlockmore (and similar programs), the logical approach
> would seem to be to split the functionality into two processes: the
> parent process remains privileged(*), but all it would do is seize the
> keyboard/mouse, blank the screen and spawn children to actually display
> the pretty patterns.  The children don't need to be priviledged, and if
> one crashes, the parent can just start another.
> 
> An alternative approach would be to have the entire saver run non-
> privileged and call a privileged program to check the password.
> Securely writing the password checking program (so it couldn't be
> used for password cracking) is non-trivial.

Isn't that a bit overkill if we have a simpler solution?

> 
> > And, regardless whether xlockmore
> >has known bugs or not,
> xlockmore-4.10 definitely does have bugs - several of the standard saver
> modes will die with SIGFPE (suddenly unlocking your screen).

Never (and I mean never :-)) saw that on my 14 machines. But I have
to say that I left out some of the modules (the ones that suck cpu time).

> 
> (*) Currently, this means setuid root, but all it needs is sufficient
>     privileges to validate a password.
> 
> Peter

	-Andre

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