Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2006 20:05:53 +0000 From: "Poul-Henning Kamp" <phk@phk.freebsd.dk> To: Chuck Swiger <cswiger@mac.com> Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Integrity checking NANOBSD images Message-ID: <77121.1152648353@critter.freebsd.dk> In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 11 Jul 2006 15:50:38 -0400." <44B4010E.7010809@mac.com>
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In message <44B4010E.7010809@mac.com>, Chuck Swiger writes: >Checksumming the device image is a fine way of checking the integrity of it, >assuming it is read-only. The only thing you might want to do is use two or >three checksum algorithms (ie, use sha256 and md5 and something else), so that >someone can't create a new image which matches the sha256 checksum of the >original. A much better idea is to send a random "salt" to be prepended to the disk image before it is run through sha256, that would prevent the attacker from running sha256 and any other algorithm you could care for on the image, store the results and return them with trojans. Copying the sha256 binary over is no guarantee against a kernel embedded trojan. But then again, how paranoid one has to be is a matter of preference. -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
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