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Date:      Mon, 18 Nov 1996 15:18:14 +1100 (EST)
From:      "Daniel O'Callaghan" <danny@panda.hilink.com.au>
To:        Mark Newton <newton@communica.com.au>
Cc:        freebsd-security@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: BoS: Exploit for sendmail smtpd bug (ver. 8.7-8.8.2).
Message-ID:  <Pine.BSF.3.91.961118151334.279E-100000@panda.hilink.com.au>
In-Reply-To: <9611180247.AA15359@communica.com.au>

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On Mon, 18 Nov 1996, Mark Newton wrote:

> Of course, one of the main reasons why sendmail is so "dangerous" is that
> despite fifteen years of it-hurts-when-I-do-this style experience, we *still*
> run it as root!  Why do we do this?  Why does nobody understand that a UNIX
> process can't just gratuitously gain privileges unless some other privileged
> program gives them away?  Given sendmail's history, why do so many people
> still trust it with root privileges when it doesn't actually need them?!
> 
> sendmail really only needs root so that it can bind to the "privileged"
> port 25 when it's running in daemon mode.  If you frob filesystem permissions
> sufficiently you can get away without providing sendmail with root
> privileges by running it with a non-root uid out of inetd (which is,
> indeed, precisely what I have done with it here at Communica, where 
> sendmail runs as the unprivileged "smtp" user).

I've been thinking about this, too.  Why *does* sendmail need to run as root?
a) to bind to port 25 (fixable with inetd, and other ways)
b) to operate on the mail queue (fixable with a group 'mail' or somesuch)
c) to deliver local mail - nope, /usr/libexec/mail.local is suid root to 
   do this.

Are there any other reasons?

Danny



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