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Date:      Thu, 19 Sep 1996 15:50:36 +0000
From:      Darius Moos <moos@degnet.baynet.de>
To:        Nadav Eiron <nadav@barcode.co.il>
Cc:        FreeBSD-questions <questions@freebsd.org>
Subject:   Re: Quick Question
Message-ID:  <32416BBE.6EF8@degnet.baynet.de>
References:  <Pine.BSF.3.91.960919132927.756A-100000@gatekeeper.barcode.co.il>

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Yes, i did not consider this case. You all were right.
Thanks to Nadav Eiron, Hr.Ladavac and Benjamin Lewis for their replies.
Seems i have to change my PATH-variable now.

Darius Moos.

Nadav Eiron wrote:
> 
> On Thu, 19 Sep 1996, Darius Moos wrote:
> 
> > Yes you are right ... BUT this security-hole only occures if you are a
> > lazy administrator (sorry, i do NOT want to say you are a lazy).
> > I would never ever execute files as root that belong to other users.
> > Doing so is really a security-hole. The administrator has always a
> > simple user-account to play around in the system. It would be my
> > fault when i'm executing unknown programms as root. When i could not
> > resist, i'd do it as the unprivileged user.
> > The other point is that IMHO adding "." to the end of the PATH-variable
> > is harmless. Assume i had a user who wrote a little programm that is
> > able to crash my system and names it "mv"; he saves it to his home-
> > directory and i as root are staying in his home-directory. Even when
> > i type "mv ..." the right thing would happen: "/bin/mv ..." would
> > be executed and NOT "<home-of-evil-user>/mv ...".
> > The other way, when "." is the first thing in the PATH, this would be
> > a security-hole introduced by the administrator.
> > Maybe i got something wrong ???
> This has been discussed over and over...
> Assume that you mistype (well, I do alot, I guess everybody does that
> once in a while). Let us further assume you tend to write ls-l instead of
> ls -l sometime (I tend to do that). Now, if the devious user of yours
> will have a program called ls-l that does something harmful, and then
> does ls -l, you wouldn't even notice that something went wrong, and his
> program will be executed because there is nothing called ls-l in the
> "standard" path that comes before "." in PATH.
> 
> Nadav
> 
> >
> > Darius Moos.
> >
> >
> > Benjamin Lewis wrote:
> > >
> > > You wrote:
> > > > Please explain to me why this is a security-risk. I've always had
> > > > "." in my PATH.
> > >
> > > Just imagine this scenario:
> > >
> > > You are "root" and I am Mr. Evil Dude, a user on your system.
> > >
> > > I compile a shell, and hide it somewhere in my directories, naming it something
> > > that seems harmless, like "irc."
> > >
> > > Next, I write a little program that, when executed as root, changes the
> > > set-uid bit on my hidden shell.  I name my little evil program "mroe" and have
> > > it return "mroe: Command not found." after doing its job.
> > >
> > > Now, I create a really interesting looking directory in /tmp.  Something like
> > > /tmp/WaReZ would probably get your attention.  I write a diatribe against
> > > people who pirate software, and name it "README." I stick my little evil
> > > program in /tmp/WaReZ, and wait for you to find the directory.
> > >
> > > You type "cd /tmp/WaReZ" and then "ls".  You see the README file and the mroe
> > > file, but "mroe" doesn't mean anything to you.  You decide to look at the
> > > README file to see what your crazy users are up to.  Maybe I stick a whole
> > > bunch of different files in the directory to hide the "mroe" program better,
> > > all of them innocent seeming.
> > >
> > > If I'm lucky, and you have fumbling fingers, my little program gets executed
> > > and I suddenly have a suid root shell, which I use to have my way with your
> > > computer and network.  You don't notice that anything weird has happened,
> > > read my README file, decide that I'm a bit strange but obviously I'm an
> > > upright fellow since I'm against software piracy and think nothing more of
> > > it.
> > >
> > > The moral of the story is that root should only execute programs in
> > > directories known to be controlled, unless he REALLY means to do otherwise.
> > > Therefore, root should not have "." in its path.
> > >
> > > Hope this helps,
> > >
> > > -Ben
> > >
> > > --
> > > Benjamin Lewis - blewis@vet.purdue.edu
> >
> > --
> >
> >
> > email: moos@degnet.baynet.de
> >

-- 


email: moos@degnet.baynet.de



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