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Date:      Mon, 10 Jul 2000 01:45:59 +0200 (CEST)
From:      Marius Bendiksen <mbendiks@eunet.no>
To:        Adam <bsdx@looksharp.net>
Cc:        "Daniel C. Sobral" <dcs@newsguy.com>, Alfred Perlstein <bright@wintelcom.net>, arch@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: making the snoop device loadable.
Message-ID:  <Pine.BSF.4.05.10007100142160.88568-100000@login-1.eunet.no>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007091330090.407-100000@turtle.looksharp.net>

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> I think you missed my point.  I'm not talking about hackers at all; if a
> hacker can load a module the game is already over.  I'm talking about
> legit people with root who might do things behind the back of the person
> who compiled the kernel without snp in the first place.  

This constitutes illigitimate use of superpowers, in my book. Clear such
things with your coadmins in advance. If you cannot trust them to stick
with your policy decisions, then they should not have root in the first
place. And if you actually give them root, then you've really shot your
self in the foot, which Unix is supposed to do without asking any
questions, provided you point the gun in that direction, and pull the
trigger.

> If this change goes in, what do you do if you wish not to have snooping
> capable through the snp device and do not wish to lock unneccessary parts
> of the system down with securelevel?

You rewrite the securelevel code, or pay someone to do so.
Or, as a very, very limited way of making it more work for the would-be
snooper, you could remove the snoop module and sources. Not that it would
be any work for them to get hold of it anyhow. And, as DCS stated, there
are pre-made klds out there which would assist them better in this
illegitimate use, anyhow.

Marius



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