Date: Thu, 12 Mar 1998 20:27:00 +0100 (MET) From: FreeBSD Security Officer <security-officer@FreeBSD.ORG> To: freebsd-security-notifications@FreeBSD.ORG, freebsd-announce@FreeBSD.ORG, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG, first-teams@first.org Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-98:01.land Message-ID: <199803121927.UAA17298@gvr.gvr.org>
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=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-98:01 Security Advisory
FreeBSD, Inc.
Topic: LAND attack can cause harm to running FreeBSD systems
Category: core
Module: kern
Announced: 1997-12-01
Affects: FreeBSD 2.1.*, FreeBSD 2.2.0R, 2.2.1R, 2.2.5R
FreeBSD-stable and FreeBSD-current
Doesn't Affect: FreeBSD 2.2.2R
Corrected: FreeBSD 2.2.6R, FreeBSD-current as of Jan 21, 1998
FreeBSD-stable as of Jan 30, 1998
FreeBSD only: no
Patches: ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/CERT/patches/SA-98:01/
=============================================================================
IMPORTANT MESSAGE: The FreeBSD advisory archive has moved from
ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT to ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/CERT
=============================================================================
I. Background
In most TCP stacks state is kept based on the source and
destination address of a packet received.
II. Problem Description
A problem exists in most FreeBSD derived stacks that allows a
malicious user to send a packet that causes the sytsem to lock
up, thus producing a denial of service attack.
III. Impact
Any person on the Internet who can send a FreeBSD machine a
packet can cause it to lock up and be taken out of service.
IV. Workaround
A firewall can be used to filter packets from the Internet that
appear to be from your local network. This will not eliminate
the threat, but will eliminate external attacks.
V. Solution
Apply the enclosed patch. There are two patches, one for FreeBSD
-current, and another for FreeBSD 2.2-stable.
patch for -current prior to Jan 21, 1998. Found in land-current.
Index: tcp_input.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/imp/FreeBSD/CVS/src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c,v
retrieving revision 1.67
retrieving revision 1.68
diff -u -r1.67 -r1.68
--- tcp_input.c 1997/12/19 23:46:15 1.67
+++ tcp_input.c 1998/01/21 02:05:59 1.68
@@ -626,6 +613,7 @@
* If the state is LISTEN then ignore segment if it contains an RST.
* If the segment contains an ACK then it is bad and send a RST.
* If it does not contain a SYN then it is not interesting; drop it.
+ * If it is from this socket, drop it, it must be forged.
* Don't bother responding if the destination was a broadcast.
* Otherwise initialize tp->rcv_nxt, and tp->irs, select an initial
* tp->iss, and send a segment:
@@ -644,6 +632,9 @@
goto dropwithreset;
if ((tiflags & TH_SYN) == 0)
goto drop;
+ if ((ti->ti_dport == ti->ti_sport) &&
+ (ti->ti_dst.s_addr == ti->ti_src.s_addr))
+ goto drop;
/*
* RFC1122 4.2.3.10, p. 104: discard bcast/mcast SYN
* in_broadcast() should never return true on a received
@@ -762,6 +753,23 @@
}
/*
+ * If the state is SYN_RECEIVED:
+ * if seg contains SYN/ACK, send a RST.
+ * if seg contains an ACK, but not for our SYN/ACK, send a RST.
+ */
+ case TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED:
+ if (tiflags & TH_ACK) {
+ if (tiflags & TH_SYN) {
+ tcpstat.tcps_badsyn++;
+ goto dropwithreset;
+ }
+ if (SEQ_LEQ(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_una) ||
+ SEQ_GT(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_max))
+ goto dropwithreset;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ /*
* If the state is SYN_SENT:
* if seg contains an ACK, but not for our SYN, drop the input.
* if seg contains a RST, then drop the connection.
@@ -1176,14 +1184,11 @@
switch (tp->t_state) {
/*
- * In SYN_RECEIVED state if the ack ACKs our SYN then enter
- * ESTABLISHED state and continue processing, otherwise
- * send an RST.
+ * In SYN_RECEIVED state, the ack ACKs our SYN, so enter
+ * ESTABLISHED state and continue processing.
+ * The ACK was checked above.
*/
case TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED:
- if (SEQ_GT(tp->snd_una, ti->ti_ack) ||
- SEQ_GT(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_max))
- goto dropwithreset;
tcpstat.tcps_connects++;
soisconnected(so);
patch for 2.2.5 and 2.2.5-stable before Jan 30, 1998 found in land-22
Index: tcp_input.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/imp/FreeBSD/CVS/src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c,v
retrieving revision 1.54.2.6
retrieving revision 1.54.2.7
diff -u -r1.54.2.6 -r1.54.2.7
--- tcp_input.c 1997/11/20 21:45:34 1.54.2.6
+++ tcp_input.c 1998/01/30 19:13:55 1.54.2.7
@@ -627,6 +614,7 @@
* If the state is LISTEN then ignore segment if it contains an RST.
* If the segment contains an ACK then it is bad and send a RST.
* If it does not contain a SYN then it is not interesting; drop it.
+ * If it is from this socket, drop it, it must be forged.
* Don't bother responding if the destination was a broadcast.
* Otherwise initialize tp->rcv_nxt, and tp->irs, select an initial
* tp->iss, and send a segment:
@@ -646,6 +634,9 @@
goto dropwithreset;
if ((tiflags & TH_SYN) == 0)
goto drop;
+ if ((ti->ti_dport == ti->ti_sport) &&
+ (ti->ti_dst.s_addr == ti->ti_src.s_addr))
+ goto drop;
/*
* RFC1122 4.2.3.10, p. 104: discard bcast/mcast SYN
* in_broadcast() should never return true on a received
@@ -765,6 +756,23 @@
}
/*
+ * If the state is SYN_RECEIVED:
+ * if seg contains SYN/ACK, send a RST.
+ * if seg contains an ACK, but not for our SYN/ACK, send a RST.
+ */
+ case TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED:
+ if (tiflags & TH_ACK) {
+ if (tiflags & TH_SYN) {
+ tcpstat.tcps_badsyn++;
+ goto dropwithreset;
+ }
+ if (SEQ_LEQ(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_una) ||
+ SEQ_GT(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_max))
+ goto dropwithreset;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ /*
* If the state is SYN_SENT:
* if seg contains an ACK, but not for our SYN, drop the input.
* if seg contains a RST, then drop the connection.
@@ -1179,14 +1187,11 @@
switch (tp->t_state) {
/*
- * In SYN_RECEIVED state if the ack ACKs our SYN then enter
- * ESTABLISHED state and continue processing, otherwise
- * send an RST.
+ * In SYN_RECEIVED state, the ack ACKs our SYN, so enter
+ * ESTABLISHED state and continue processing.
+ * The ACK was checked above.
*/
case TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED:
- if (SEQ_GT(tp->snd_una, ti->ti_ack) ||
- SEQ_GT(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_max))
- goto dropwithreset;
tcpstat.tcps_connects++;
soisconnected(so);
=============================================================================
FreeBSD, Inc.
Web Site: http://www.freebsd.org/
Confidential contacts: security-officer@freebsd.org
PGP Key: ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/CERT/public_key.asc
Security notifications: security-notifications@freebsd.org
Security public discussion: security@freebsd.org
Notice: Any patches in this document may not apply cleanly due to
modifications caused by digital signature or mailer software.
Please reference the URL listed at the top of this document
for original copies of all patches if necessary.
=============================================================================
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