Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 21:54:26 -0400 From: Garrett Wollman <wollman@bimajority.org> To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Speed and security of /dev/urandom Message-ID: <21452.29394.37555.179586@hergotha.csail.mit.edu> In-Reply-To: <alpine.GSO.1.10.1407191701370.21571@multics.mit.edu> References: <53C85F42.1000704@pyro.eu.org> <20140719190348.GM45513@funkthat.com> <20140719192605.GV93733@kib.kiev.ua> <53CAD950.1010609@pyro.eu.org> <20140719205350.GX93733@kib.kiev.ua> <alpine.GSO.1.10.1407191701370.21571@multics.mit.edu>
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<<On Sat, 19 Jul 2014 17:02:09 -0400 (EDT), Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> said: > I think there is a lot of value in providing a syscall interface which can > be the default way for applications to retrieve random bits. The OpenBSD guys have proposed a new posix_XXXX_random() family of interfaces (XXXX being undecided as yet) to the Austin Group, specifically for this purpose. We should implement it. (It need not be a direct system-call interface, but for security it should not rely on being able to open any particular file or device.) -GAWollman
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