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Date:      Tue, 23 Jan 2007 12:34:44 +0100
From:      Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
To:        Alexander Leidinger <Alexander@Leidinger.net>
Cc:        freebsd-security@freebsd.org, freebsd-stable@freebsd.org, Colin Percival <cperciva@freebsd.org>, "Simon L. Nielsen" <simon@FreeBSD.org>
Subject:   Re: Improving FreeBSD-SA-07:01.jail fix [was: HEADS UP: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-07:01.jail]
Message-ID:  <20070123113444.GB11767@garage.freebsd.pl>
In-Reply-To: <20070120152423.3195b15b@Magellan.Leidinger.net>
References:  <200701111841.l0BIfWOn015231@freefall.freebsd.org> <45A6DB76.40800@freebsd.org> <20070113112937.GI90718@garage.freebsd.pl> <20070120122432.GA971@zaphod.nitro.dk> <20070120130308.GD6697@garage.freebsd.pl> <20070120152423.3195b15b@Magellan.Leidinger.net>

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On Sat, Jan 20, 2007 at 03:24:23PM +0100, Alexander Leidinger wrote:
> Quoting Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org> (Sat, 20 Jan 2007 14:03:08 =
+0100):
>=20
> > I fully agree that console.log should be outside a jail. At least noone
> > proposed safe solution so far, which also means it's not an easy fix.
>=20
> What's unsafe about my proposal? I did had a look at the code now, and
> it should work (with minor mods).
>=20
> Original:
> ---snip---
>                 _tmp_jail=3D${_tmp_dir}/jail.$$
>                 eval jail ${_flags} -i ${_rootdir} ${_hostname} \
>                         ${_ip} ${_exec_start} > ${_tmp_jail} 2>&1
>=20
>                 if [ "$?" -eq 0 ] ; then
>                         _jail_id=3D$(head -1 ${_tmp_jail})
>                         i=3D1
>                         while [ true ]; do
>                                 eval out=3D\"\${_exec_afterstart${i}:-''}=
\"
>=20
>                                 if [ -z "$out" ]; then
>                                         break;
>                                 fi
>=20
>                                 jexec "${_jail_id}" ${out}
>                                 i=3D$((i + 1))
>                         done
>=20
>                         echo -n " $_hostname"
>                         tail +2 ${_tmp_jail} >${_consolelog}
>                         echo ${_jail_id} > /var/run/jail_${_jail}.id
> ---snip---
>=20
> Pseudocode proposal, not tested (changes prefixed with 'x'):
> ---snip---
>                 _tmp_jail=3D${_tmp_dir}/jail.$$
> x               # assuming safe _consolelog (inside chroot) according
> to the
> x               # previous mails here in the thread
> x		eval (echo "" ; \
> x                       jail ${_flags} -I /var/run/jail_${_jail}.id \
> x                       ${_rootdir} ${_hostname} {_ip} ${_exec_start}) \
> x                       > ${_consolelog} 2>&1
>=20
>                 if [ "$?" -eq 0 ] ; then
> x                       _jail_id=3D$(cat /var/run/jail_${_jail}.id)
>                         i=3D1
>                         while [ true ]; do
>                                 eval out=3D\"\${_exec_afterstart${i}:-''}=
\"
>=20
>                                 if [ -z "$out" ]; then
>                                         break;
>                                 fi
>=20
>                                 jexec "${_jail_id}" ${out}
>                                 i=3D$((i + 1))
>                         done
>=20
>                         echo -n " $_hostname"
> x
> x
> ---snip---
>=20
> Repeating my points:
>  - sanitize the consolelog path like discussed in this thread
>  - the jail is not running, so nobody can create a link (jail
>    root within FS space of another jail still prohibited)
>  - subshell to group echo and jail
>  - 'echo ""' to make sure the file exists when the jail starts
>  - (new) additional flag to jail to write a jid file
>  - redirect to the consolelog, it is still open from the echo
>    when the jail starts so there's no race
>=20
> I did test "(echo 1; sleep 60 ; echo 2) >/tmp/test" in /bin/sh, and it
> is line buffered, so the above works.
>=20
> Where's the security problem in the above?

It looks like it may work, but I still find it a bit risky. If sh(1) can
reopen the file under some conditions or someone in the future will
modify sh(1) in that way (because he won't be aware that such a change
may have impact on system security) we will have a security hole.
Chances are small, but I'm not going to be the one who will accept that
change:)

--=20
Pawel Jakub Dawidek                       http://www.wheel.pl
pjd@FreeBSD.org                           http://www.FreeBSD.org
FreeBSD committer                         Am I Evil? Yes, I Am!

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