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Date:      Sat, 23 Jan 1999 21:18:23 -0500 (EST)
From:      Robert Watson <robert@cyrus.watson.org>
To:        The Unicorn <unicorn@unicorn.xs4all.nl>
Cc:        cjclark@home.com, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: bin Directory Ownership
Message-ID:  <Pine.BSF.3.96.990123211710.3494A-100000@fledge.watson.org>
In-Reply-To: <19990123132613.A21293@unicorn.quux.org>

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On Sat, 23 Jan 1999, The Unicorn wrote:

> On Sat, Jan 23, 1999 at 06:01:40AM -0500, Robert Watson wrote:
> > 
> > You are correct--there is no security improvement through the use of the
> > bin user.  However, it is also the case that (aside from false assumptions
> > about some improvement) security is probably not damaged by having a bin
> > user.  I am in the process of some research analyzing the impact of file
> > and directory ownership affecting the UNIX trust model (especially w.r.t.
> > setuid and setgid binaries).  I will post the results when I finish up
> > (probably in a month or so).  Access to the bin account is very limited;
> > effectively, to acquire a uid bin process capable of modifying the
> > binaries, you would first have to have a uid root process that you had
> > subverted.
> 
> This is  not always the  case. Have  a look at  the old but  still valid
> paper from  Wietse and Dan: "admin-guide-to-cracking-101"  also known as
> "Improving the  Security of Your  Site by Breaking Into  it". Especially
> the part on the use of rsh and the wildcard in the /etc/hosts.equiv file
> (yeah, I know that allowing the r-commands is a BIG NO-NO ;-).

At least on my system, none of these accounts have valid shells, so r*
should block login (/nonexistent).

  Robert N Watson 

robert@fledge.watson.org              http://www.watson.org/~robert/
PGP key fingerprint: 03 01 DD 8E 15 67 48 73  25 6D 10 FC EC 68 C1 1C

Carnegie Mellon University            http://www.cmu.edu/
TIS Labs at Network Associates, Inc.  http://www.tis.com/
SafePort Network Services             http://www.safeport.com/


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