Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2000 08:03:02 +0200 From: Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za> To: Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.org> Cc: current@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak Message-ID: <200007240603.IAA03449@grimreaper.grondar.za> In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007231747430.79995-100000@freefall.freebsd.org> ; from Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.org> "Sun, 23 Jul 2000 18:04:50 MST." References: <Pine.BSF.4.21.0007231747430.79995-100000@freefall.freebsd.org>
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> http://www.counterpane.com/pseudorandom_number.html > > Cryptlib is described here: > > http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/cryptlib/ Thanks! > > Asynchonous reseeding _improves_ the situation; the attacker cannot force > > it to any degree of accuracy, and if he has the odds stacked heavily against > > him that each 256-bits of output will have an associated reseed, it makes > > his job pretty damn difficult. > > What I meant with that point is that the user may get, say an extra few > hundred bits out of it with no new entropy before the scheduled reseed > task kicks in. How does he know which bits are which? His analysis task just got a whole lot more difficult. M -- Mark Murray Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
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