Date: Sat, 8 Sep 2001 21:51:56 -0700 (PDT) From: Matt Dillon <dillon@earth.backplane.com> To: "Andrey A. Chernov" <ache@nagual.pp.ru>, Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org>, "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>, Jordan Hubbard <jkh@FreeBSD.ORG>, security@FreeBSD.ORG, audit@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Fwd: Multiple vendor 'Taylor UUCP' problems. Message-ID: <200109090451.f894puV31109@earth.backplane.com> References: <20010908170257.A82082@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010908174304.A88816@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010909045226.A33654@nagual.pp.ru> <20010908180848.A94567@xor.obsecurity.org> <200109090120.f891KvM14677@xerxes.courtesan.com> <20010909054457.A34319@nagual.pp.ru> <20010908185602.B5619@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010909060144.B34519@nagual.pp.ru> <20010908191013.B5881@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010909062025.B34828@nagual.pp.ru> <20010908193252.A7066@xor.obsecurity.org>
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Wow. A lot of replies on this thread! I've read every one and would
like to interject a couple of points if I may:
* Regardless of security problems with the uucp binaries, it is still
our job to protect root.
* No binary in a standard system path (/bin, /usr/bin, /sbin, /usr/sbin)
should be editable by non-root, no matter what. Even if cron doesn't
run the binary, a sysop su'd to root might, or someone from another
user account. 'schg' accomplishes this.
* I don't understand the person who was saying that NFS installs wouldn't
work. I use NFS based installs for everything, it works fine. The
typical method is to remotely mount /usr/src and do a local
'make installworld', not to remotely mount the destination host and do
the 'make installworld' with the mount as a target.
* Several other binaries, such as 'man', are already installed noschg,
as well as some libraries. We aren't breaking new ground here.
I think it's worth getting into -stable for the release, but it's Jordan's
decision. I *am* going to commit the schg changes to -current now since
there does not seem to be any opposition to it. Remember guys: security
should always be a layered onion approach, we are not precluding additional
fixes by making this change.
-Matt
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