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Date:      Tue, 06 Jun 2000 10:14:23 +0200
From:      Mark Murray <mark@grimreaper.grondar.za>
To:        "Jeroen C. van Gelderen" <jeroen@vangelderen.org>
Cc:        Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za>, arch@FreeBSD.org, phk@FreeBSD.org
Subject:   Re: (2nd iteration) New /dev/(random|null|zero) - review, please 
Message-ID:  <200006060814.KAA21235@gratis.grondar.za>
In-Reply-To: <393BEE84.BBAD3E82@vangelderen.org> ; from "Jeroen C. van Gelderen" <jeroen@vangelderen.org>  "Mon, 05 Jun 2000 14:16:36 -0400."
References:  <393BEE84.BBAD3E82@vangelderen.org> 

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> > I have finished doing a MI /dev/null and /dev/zero, and I have got a
> > new /dev/random. I'm looking for reviewers.
> 
> I've already submitted a MI /dev/[null|zero] for commit to PHK. He
> said he would commit them after testing. It's the same driver you 
> have already seen at  http://jeroen.vangelderen.org/FreeBSD .

I stole lots of ideas from you :-); I think mine is faster...

> > o The random number generator will give random-looking output, but does
> >   absolutely no harvesting of entropy at the moment. Because I want
> >   it to be a loadable module, I need some way of registering the entropy
> >   harvesting routines. Something like weak-symboled routines that are
> >   overridden when the module is loaded would be ideal. Suggestions?
> 
> Split-level. Entropy sources should export an entropy device. Yarrow
> should bind to all available entropy devices and use those. This would
> allow for
> - entropy devices in KLDs.
> - dynamic addition/removal of entropy sources (USB).
> - separation of RNG policy (Yarrow) from entropy gathering.
> - dynamic IRQs not affecting RNG security.

Makes sense, but I need an actual mechanism for achiving this. BDE
suggested the module event handler; I need to investigate.

> > o The RNG is slow; the others are much faster than their originals.
> 
> Can be tweaked. Use a 256-bit cipher like Rijndael and build a hash
> out of it. Would improve security too as the entropy pool would hold
> 256 bits. You can also pre-generate a few KB of random bits.

Hmmm.... Sounds good! Got a Rijndael reference?

M
--
Mark Murray
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