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Date:      Sun, 29 Sep 2002 23:07:36 +0000
From:      "June Carey" <carey_june@hotmail.com>
To:        freebsd-ports@freebsd.org
Subject:   S/W RELEASE: Caesarion v3
Message-ID:  <F11ug30U6zvMp9bhSiU00006c70@hotmail.com>

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http://www.rcarey.org/cion.html

29th September 2002

Caesarion Version 3 released.

NOTE: Caesarion Version 3 deprecates all previous versions. Furthermore, v3 
is not inter-operable with any previous version. If you are using a previous 
version of Caesarion, you are advised to upgrade immediately and 
regenerate/redistribute keys due to the improvements listed below:


Changes from version 2:
o A further disclaimer was added to the new copyright license.
o Fixed two incorrect assertions in RSA_KeyGen.cxx.
o Use OpenSSL MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH instead of own md5digestLen.
o Don't confirm password entry in cion_encrypt(1) and cion_decrypt(1) making 
the software easier/faster to use.
o Various public methods in various classes were moved to protected or 
private access (where they should have been in the first place).
o New Entropy.h class which returns raw random data instead of pumping it 
through a PRNG; this makes more sense, is faster, and should be more secure.
o The Entropy generation technique has had a massive performance increase 
without degrading its security or output quality. The software is much 
faster now because of this.
o Performance increase in new Entropy.h class by having a class-wide Random 
object (instead of instantiation on every call to Entropy::Stir()).
o A possible security flaw was discovered in the RSA implementation; in 
general use of this software it is likely that small (~400 bytes) amounts of 
data are encrypted (per chunk), which in turn means that the 4 bytes used 
for specifying the data-size will have 2 bytes equal to zero. This means 
that an adversary can guess 2 bytes of the original plaintext message. 
Whether or not this could be extended to a successful attack is beyond my 
cryptography skills/knowledge. Hence, the most sensible thing to do was to 
correct this possible problem. Due to the new changes necessary to correct 
this possible problem, the software is now faster than it was before.
o Remove ULong.h from distribution (no longer required).
o Performance increase in Entropy::Ulong().
o Various cleanups.

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