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Date:      Sat, 13 Mar 1999 20:39:02 -0600
From:      Alan Weber <aaweber@austin.rr.com>
To:        Robert Watson <robert+freebsd@cyrus.watson.org>
Cc:        freebsd-security@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: ACLs was disapointing security architecture
Message-ID:  <19990313203902.B1850@austin.rr.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSF.3.96.990313201103.2563G-100000@fledge.watson.org>; from Robert Watson on Sat, Mar 13, 1999 at 08:20:03PM -0500
References:  <19990313190305.A1423@austin.rr.com> <Pine.BSF.3.96.990313201103.2563G-100000@fledge.watson.org>

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--> > --> :    You know, it wouldn't cost too much to implement ACLs with an extra
--> > --> :    inode if we implemented an ACL cache, allowing multiple references to
--> > --> :    the same ACL inode.  When someone changes the ACL associated with a file,
--> > --> :    it would hop to a different ACL inode.  There'd have to be a mechanism
--> > --> :    to prevent excessive fragmentation but I think it would work in general
--> > --> :    terms and not even eat that many inodes.
 
--> > --> Something like this certainly makes sense.  You need to keep track of how 
--> > --> many files are using that ACL inode, but that is much the same problem as 
--> > --> hard links.  What I wonder about is what the hit rate is going to be?  I am
--> > --> fairly sure that most of my ACLs will be identical, so I suppose the odds of
--> > --> having one in core is pretty high.  You would also win on what ever the ACL 
--> > --> equivelant of chmod * is.  
  
--> > I would suggest that each directory have an ACL inode and that by default each
--> > file will use the inode of the directory ACL inode. This will cause ACLs to 
--> > propagate down a directory tree when subdirectories are created. I generally
--> > administer access rights on a directory basis. I am very used to the NetWare
--> > trustee scheme and find if very convenient to manage user file permissions 
--> > on a directory basis. Would it be possible to increase the granularity of 
--> > the permissions with the ACL scheme (delete, create, rename, write, append, 
--> > read, grant, etc.)? I would be willing to help on implementing ACLs. 

--> While I recognize the simplicity and usefulness of per-directory ACLs (a
--> la AFS and Coda), I suspect that ACLs in the style of POSIX.1e will
--> probably achieve greater portability (Solaris, Linux, etc).  Since
--> permissions are currently on the granularity of files, the POSIX.1e
--> mechanism is probably also more consistent with the current permission
--> model.
 
I am not suggesting directory-only ACLs but want the file ACL to point to the
directory ACL unless explicitly changed on a per file basis. I like the above
scheme to reuse ACLs as one change can be efficiently propagated to a huge number
of files versus having to fetch/update every file ACL in a directory hierarchy.

-- 
When I was a kid I had to rub sticks together to multiply and divide numbers. 
A calculator was a job description.


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