Date: Mon, 23 Oct 1995 17:18:23 -0600 From: Nate Williams <nate@rocky.sri.MT.net> To: =?KOI8-R?Q?=E1=CE=C4=D2=C5=CA_=FE=C5=D2=CE=CF=D7?= (aka Andrey A. Chernov, Black Mage) <ache@astral.msk.su> Cc: ache@freefall.freebsd.org, John Polstra <jdp@polstra.com>, freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org Subject: Re: ld.so, LD_NOSTD_PATH, and suid/sgid programs Message-ID: <199510232318.RAA24039@rocky.sri.MT.net> In-Reply-To: <Aagc1ZmOzJ@ache.dialup.demos.ru> References: <m0t7SFB-000078C@seattle.polstra.com> <Aagc1ZmOzJ@ache.dialup.demos.ru>
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> >Can you see a security reason for disabling LD_NOSTD_PATH for suid/sgid > >programs? If not, I think that the recent change should be removed from > >rtld.c. > > In this case I keep in mind some shell script execution which calls > setuid programs. By setiing LD_NOSTD_PATH user allows such > programs easily fails, it is clear. Why should a program which calls setuid programs fail in the first place? If they are calling a setuid program it will still only look in the 'normal' places for shlibs, which means they are safe. > Here can be very unpleasant > side effect that usually shell scripts not expects setuid > programs failing for such reasons and have lack of error traping > at this point. Can you give a more concrete example of where this is a 'bad thing'? I can't even imagine one, even with this explanation. Nate
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