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Date:      18 Oct 1999 10:56:51 +0200
From:      Dag-Erling Smorgrav <des@flood.ping.uio.no>
To:        Justin Wells <jread@semiotek.com>
Cc:        Doug <Doug@gorean.org>, Antoine Beaupre <beaupran@IRO.UMontreal.CA>, Mike Nowlin <mike@argos.org>, "Rashid N. Achilov" <shelton@sentry.granch.ru>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: kern.securelevel and X
Message-ID:  <xzpso392gj0.fsf@flood.ping.uio.no>
In-Reply-To: Justin Wells's message of "Mon, 18 Oct 1999 04:30:39 -0400"
References:  <XFMail.991015111802.shelton@sentry.granch.ru> <Pine.LNX.4.05.9910150036170.5339-100000@jason.argos.org> <14343.23571.679909.243732@blm30.IRO.UMontreal.CA> <19991017012750.A812@fever.semiotek.com> <380A1E2C.CCA326F5@gorean.org> <19991018024704.A512@semiotek.com> <xzpyad12jd7.fsf@flood.ping.uio.no> <19991018043039.B1711@semiotek.com>

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Justin Wells <jread@semiotek.com> writes:
> On Mon, Oct 18, 1999 at 09:55:32AM +0200, Dag-Erling Smorgrav wrote:
> > Well, then, fix mount(8) so it won't run at high securelevels. You
> > know where to find the source code.
> It's mount(2) that has to be fixed. I suppose I could go and look at 
> it, but I'm not confident that I understand all the different 
> implications of the securelevel stuff at that level.

Here's an untested patch for -CURRENT which will make mount(2) fail
with EPERM if running at securelevel 4 or higher. Took me all of three
minutes to throw together.

Index: vfs_syscalls.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/ncvs/src/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c,v
retrieving revision 1.138
diff -u -r1.138 vfs_syscalls.c
--- vfs_syscalls.c	1999/10/03 12:18:14	1.138
+++ vfs_syscalls.c	1999/10/18 08:52:56
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@
 
 	if (usermount == 0 && (error = suser(p)))
 		return (error);
+	if (securelevel > 3)
+		return (EPERM);
 	/*
 	 * Do not allow NFS export by non-root users.
 	 */

I'm starting to think that secure levels should be implemented as
bitmasks, with one bit for each operation or group of operation to be
allowed or denied (0 = allow, 1 = deny). The if statement above could
be rewritten as:

	if (securemask & SEC_MOUNT)
		return (EPERM);

Using a simple bitmask might be too simple though (it would restrict
us to 32 or 64 distinct operations), so we might want to hide the
actual implementation behind a function call or macro:

	if (!sec_permitted(SEC_MOUNT))
		return (EPERM);

DES
-- 
Dag-Erling Smorgrav - des@flood.ping.uio.no


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