Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 10:05:59 +0000 (UTC) From: Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des@FreeBSD.org> To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r255442 - in head/sys: fs/nullfs kern net netinet6 netnatm Message-ID: <201309101005.r8AA5xNN096462@svn.freebsd.org>
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Author: des Date: Tue Sep 10 10:05:59 2013 New Revision: 255442 URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/255442 Log: Fix the length calculation for the final block of a sendfile(2) transmission which could be tricked into rounding up to the nearest page size, leaking up to a page of kernel memory. [13:11] In IPv6 and NetATM, stop SIOCSIFADDR, SIOCSIFBRDADDR, SIOCSIFDSTADDR and SIOCSIFNETMASK at the socket layer rather than pass them on to the link layer without validation or credential checks. [SA-13:12] Prevent cross-mount hardlinks between different nullfs mounts of the same underlying filesystem. [SA-13:13] Security: CVE-2013-5666 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:11.sendfile Security: CVE-2013-5691 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:12.ifioctl Security: CVE-2013-5710 Security: FreeBSD-SA-13:13.nullfs Approved by: re Modified: head/sys/fs/nullfs/null_vnops.c head/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c head/sys/net/if.c head/sys/netinet6/in6.c head/sys/netnatm/natm.c Modified: head/sys/fs/nullfs/null_vnops.c ============================================================================== --- head/sys/fs/nullfs/null_vnops.c Tue Sep 10 05:59:09 2013 (r255441) +++ head/sys/fs/nullfs/null_vnops.c Tue Sep 10 10:05:59 2013 (r255442) @@ -858,6 +858,15 @@ null_vptocnp(struct vop_vptocnp_args *ap return (error); } +static int +null_link(struct vop_link_args *ap) +{ + + if (ap->a_tdvp->v_mount != ap->a_vp->v_mount) + return (EXDEV); + return (null_bypass((struct vop_generic_args *)ap)); +} + /* * Global vfs data structures */ @@ -871,6 +880,7 @@ struct vop_vector null_vnodeops = { .vop_getwritemount = null_getwritemount, .vop_inactive = null_inactive, .vop_islocked = vop_stdislocked, + .vop_link = null_link, .vop_lock1 = null_lock, .vop_lookup = null_lookup, .vop_open = null_open, Modified: head/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c ============================================================================== --- head/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c Tue Sep 10 05:59:09 2013 (r255441) +++ head/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c Tue Sep 10 10:05:59 2013 (r255442) @@ -2221,11 +2221,10 @@ retry_space: * or the passed in nbytes. */ pgoff = (vm_offset_t)(off & PAGE_MASK); - if (nbytes) - rem = (nbytes - fsbytes - loopbytes); - else - rem = va.va_size - - offset - fsbytes - loopbytes; + rem = va.va_size - offset; + if (nbytes != 0) + rem = omin(rem, nbytes); + rem -= fsbytes + loopbytes; xfsize = omin(PAGE_SIZE - pgoff, rem); xfsize = omin(space - loopbytes, xfsize); if (xfsize <= 0) { Modified: head/sys/net/if.c ============================================================================== --- head/sys/net/if.c Tue Sep 10 05:59:09 2013 (r255441) +++ head/sys/net/if.c Tue Sep 10 10:05:59 2013 (r255442) @@ -2553,11 +2553,23 @@ ifioctl(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, c CURVNET_RESTORE(); return (EOPNOTSUPP); } + + /* + * Pass the request on to the socket control method, and if the + * latter returns EOPNOTSUPP, directly to the interface. + * + * Make an exception for the legacy SIOCSIF* requests. Drivers + * trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already privileged + * layer, and do not perform any credentials checks or input + * validation. + */ #ifndef COMPAT_43 error = ((*so->so_proto->pr_usrreqs->pru_control)(so, cmd, data, ifp, td)); - if (error == EOPNOTSUPP && ifp != NULL && ifp->if_ioctl != NULL) + if (error == EOPNOTSUPP && ifp != NULL && ifp->if_ioctl != NULL && + cmd != SIOCSIFADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFBRDADDR && + cmd != SIOCSIFDSTADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFNETMASK) error = (*ifp->if_ioctl)(ifp, cmd, data); #else { @@ -2601,7 +2613,9 @@ ifioctl(struct socket *so, u_long cmd, c data, ifp, td)); if (error == EOPNOTSUPP && ifp != NULL && - ifp->if_ioctl != NULL) + ifp->if_ioctl != NULL && + cmd != SIOCSIFADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFBRDADDR && + cmd != SIOCSIFDSTADDR && cmd != SIOCSIFNETMASK) error = (*ifp->if_ioctl)(ifp, cmd, data); switch (ocmd) { Modified: head/sys/netinet6/in6.c ============================================================================== --- head/sys/netinet6/in6.c Tue Sep 10 05:59:09 2013 (r255441) +++ head/sys/netinet6/in6.c Tue Sep 10 10:05:59 2013 (r255442) @@ -431,6 +431,18 @@ in6_control(struct socket *so, u_long cm case SIOCGIFSTAT_ICMP6: sa6 = &ifr->ifr_addr; break; + case SIOCSIFADDR: + case SIOCSIFBRDADDR: + case SIOCSIFDSTADDR: + case SIOCSIFNETMASK: + /* + * Although we should pass any non-INET6 ioctl requests + * down to driver, we filter some legacy INET requests. + * Drivers trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already + * privileged layer, and do not perform any credentials + * checks or input validation. + */ + return (EINVAL); default: sa6 = NULL; break; Modified: head/sys/netnatm/natm.c ============================================================================== --- head/sys/netnatm/natm.c Tue Sep 10 05:59:09 2013 (r255441) +++ head/sys/netnatm/natm.c Tue Sep 10 10:05:59 2013 (r255442) @@ -339,6 +339,21 @@ natm_usr_control(struct socket *so, u_lo npcb = (struct natmpcb *)so->so_pcb; KASSERT(npcb != NULL, ("natm_usr_control: npcb == NULL")); + switch (cmd) { + case SIOCSIFADDR: + case SIOCSIFBRDADDR: + case SIOCSIFDSTADDR: + case SIOCSIFNETMASK: + /* + * Although we should pass any non-ATM ioctl requests + * down to driver, we filter some legacy INET requests. + * Drivers trust SIOCSIFADDR et al to come from an already + * privileged layer, and do not perform any credentials + * checks or input validation. + */ + return (EINVAL); + } + if (ifp == NULL || ifp->if_ioctl == NULL) return (EOPNOTSUPP); return ((*ifp->if_ioctl)(ifp, cmd, arg));
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