Date: Tue, 15 Dec 1998 01:17:45 -0800 (PST) From: Matthew Dillon <dillon@apollo.backplane.com> To: Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za> Cc: Joe Abley <jabley@clear.co.nz>, Kevin Day <toasty@home.dragondata.com>, freebsd-current@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: modification to exec in the kernel? Message-ID: <199812150917.BAA52694@apollo.backplane.com> References: <19981215120357.B11837@clear.co.nz> <199812142331.RAA17203@home.dragondata.com> <19981215124818.A22526@clear.co.nz> <199812150644.IAA67338@greenpeace.grondar.za>
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:Joe Abley wrote:
:> I looked at that; however, remember the users will have chrooted access
:> to their directories, and within the chrooted tree will be /usr and
:> descendants containing controlled binaries (owned by someone else, e.g.
:> "root") like perl, awk, sh, etc.
:
:Your security model is flawed. A user can do anything she wants
:(justabout) with shellscript and perl. Picking on compiled binaries
:is not going to make you that much safer.
:
:M
I think a chroot'd environment can be even *more* dangerous then a
non-chroot'd environment because critical system configuration files
will be missing and potentially creatable by the user - if the
chroot'd environment is based in a user-owned directory and you've
installed any suid or sgid system binaries, you have an extremely
serious security hole on your hands.
-Matt
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:Mark Murray
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Matthew Dillon Engineering, HiWay Technologies, Inc. & BEST Internet
Communications & God knows what else.
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