Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 15:37:02 -0700 (PDT) From: Nate Lawson <nate@root.org> To: David Malone <dwmalone@maths.tcd.ie> Cc: Mark Murray <mark@grondar.org> Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/sys/modules/random Makefile src/sys/dev/random randomdev.h randomdev_soft.c randomdev_soft.h yar Message-ID: <20040412153536.L70759@root.org> In-Reply-To: <20040412113635.GA38733@walton.maths.tcd.ie> References: <20040410155637.Q58852@root.org> <200404110746.i3B7kiIn075106@grimreaper.grondar.org> <20040412113635.GA38733@walton.maths.tcd.ie>
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On Mon, 12 Apr 2004, David Malone wrote: > On Sun, Apr 11, 2004 at 08:46:43AM +0100, Mark Murray wrote: > > Yarrow is unsuitable for this purpose; it is a great generator when > > you have a low-entropy environment and you need to protect against > > attackers having potential knowledge of the inputs. > > I still think it would be nice if our random infrastructure had a > block-until-accumulated-'enough'-randomness mode, like the old > /dev/random had, to avoid some future attack based on Yarrow's fixed > size state. I don't think it will be a realistic attack any time > soon, but it might be nice for baco-hat types. In the case where > high-quality, fast hardware based generators are available, this > seems to be a more realistic option though. > > I'm happy enough to live without this, since we thrashed this out > before, but if you're looking at options, you might keep it at the > back of your mind. Please don't sidetrack the discussion. That is a separate topic. -Nate
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