Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 08:07:56 +0000 (UTC) From: =?UTF-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=c3=b8rgrav?= <des@FreeBSD.org> To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-vendor@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r343766 - vendor-crypto/openssh/dist Message-ID: <201902050807.x1587uap026577@repo.freebsd.org>
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Author: des Date: Tue Feb 5 08:07:56 2019 New Revision: 343766 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/343766 Log: Merge upstream 391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc: | remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user. | | This checking provides some protection against a malicious server | sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted | files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules. | | For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check. | | reported by Harry Sintonen | fix approach suggested by markus@; | has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@ | | OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda Modified: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.1 vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.c Modified: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.1 ============================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.1 Tue Feb 5 08:05:42 2019 (r343765) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.1 Tue Feb 5 08:07:56 2019 (r343766) @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ .Nd secure copy (remote file copy program) .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm scp -.Op Fl 346BCpqrv +.Op Fl 346BCpqrTv .Op Fl c Ar cipher .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config .Op Fl i Ar identity_file @@ -207,6 +207,16 @@ to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand .Xr ssh 1 options. +.It Fl T +Disable strict filename checking. +By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory +.Nm +checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line +to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files. +Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret +filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected. +This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that +the server will not send unexpected filenames. .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes Modified: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.c ============================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.c Tue Feb 5 08:05:42 2019 (r343765) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.c Tue Feb 5 08:07:56 2019 (r343766) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.197 2018/06/01 04:31:48 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.202 2019/01/26 22:41:28 djm Exp $ */ /* * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ #include <dirent.h> #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> +#include <fnmatch.h> #include <limits.h> #include <locale.h> #include <pwd.h> @@ -375,14 +376,14 @@ void verifydir(char *); struct passwd *pwd; uid_t userid; int errs, remin, remout; -int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; +int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; #define CMDNEEDS 64 char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ int response(void); void rsource(char *, struct stat *); -void sink(int, char *[]); +void sink(int, char *[], const char *); void source(int, char *[]); void tolocal(int, char *[]); void toremote(int, char *[]); @@ -421,8 +422,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none"); addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no"); - fflag = tflag = 0; - while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) + fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0; + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, + "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:J:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* User-visible flags. */ case '1': @@ -501,9 +503,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) setmode(0, O_BINARY); #endif break; + case 'T': + Tflag = 1; + break; default: usage(); } + } argc -= optind; argv += optind; @@ -534,7 +540,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) } if (tflag) { /* Receive data. */ - sink(argc, argv); + sink(argc, argv, NULL); exit(errs != 0); } if (argc < 2) @@ -791,7 +797,7 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv) continue; } free(bp); - sink(1, argv + argc - 1); + sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src); (void) close(remin); remin = remout = -1; } @@ -967,7 +973,7 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8)) void -sink(int argc, char **argv) +sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src) { static BUF buffer; struct stat stb; @@ -983,6 +989,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) unsigned long long ull; int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048]; + char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL; struct timeval tv[2]; #define atime tv[0] @@ -1007,6 +1014,17 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) targisdir = 1; + if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) { + /* + * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match + * the requested destination file glob. + */ + if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL) + fatal("strdup failed"); + if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) { + *restrict_pattern++ = '\0'; + } + } for (first = 1;; first = 0) { cp = buf; if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) @@ -1110,6 +1128,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); exit(1); } + if (restrict_pattern != NULL && + fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0) + SCREWUP("filename does not match request"); if (targisdir) { static char *namebuf; static size_t cursize; @@ -1147,7 +1168,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv) goto bad; } vect[0] = xstrdup(np); - sink(1, vect); + sink(1, vect, src); if (setimes) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
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