Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2008 21:53:10 +0000 (UTC) From: Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r184425 - in head/sys: conf security/mac Message-ID: <200810282153.m9SLrA9H004839@svn.freebsd.org>
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Author: rwatson Date: Tue Oct 28 21:53:10 2008 New Revision: 184425 URL: http://svn.freebsd.org/changeset/base/184425 Log: Break out strictly credential-related portions of mac_process.c into a new file, mac_cred.c. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Added: head/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c (contents, props changed) - copied, changed from r184412, head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c Modified: head/sys/conf/files head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c Modified: head/sys/conf/files ============================================================================== --- head/sys/conf/files Tue Oct 28 21:05:09 2008 (r184424) +++ head/sys/conf/files Tue Oct 28 21:53:10 2008 (r184425) @@ -2175,6 +2175,7 @@ security/audit/audit_trigger.c optional security/audit/audit_worker.c optional audit security/mac/mac_atalk.c optional mac netatalk security/mac/mac_audit.c optional mac audit +security/mac/mac_cred.c optional mac security/mac/mac_framework.c optional mac security/mac/mac_inet.c optional mac inet security/mac/mac_inet6.c optional mac inet6 Copied and modified: head/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c (from r184412, head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c) ============================================================================== --- head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c Tue Oct 28 12:49:07 2008 (r184412, copy source) +++ head/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c Tue Oct 28 21:53:10 2008 (r184425) @@ -71,19 +71,6 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include <security/mac/mac_internal.h> #include <security/mac/mac_policy.h> -static int mac_mmap_revocation = 1; -SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation, CTLFLAG_RW, - &mac_mmap_revocation, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files on subject " - "relabel"); - -static int mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow = 0; -SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW, - &mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files via " - "copy-on-write semantics, or by removing all write access"); - -static void mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td, - struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map); - struct label * mac_cred_label_alloc(void) { @@ -104,26 +91,6 @@ mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred) cred->cr_label = NULL; } -static struct label * -mac_proc_label_alloc(void) -{ - struct label *label; - - label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK); - MAC_PERFORM(proc_init_label, label); - return (label); -} - -void -mac_proc_init(struct proc *p) -{ - - if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_PROC) - p->p_label = mac_proc_label_alloc(); - else - p->p_label = NULL; -} - void mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label) { @@ -142,24 +109,6 @@ mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred) } } -static void -mac_proc_label_free(struct label *label) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(proc_destroy_label, label); - mac_labelzone_free(label); -} - -void -mac_proc_destroy(struct proc *p) -{ - - if (p->p_label != NULL) { - mac_proc_label_free(p->p_label); - p->p_label = NULL; - } -} - /* * When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be * updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system @@ -219,13 +168,6 @@ mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label return (error); } -void -mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td); -} - /* * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally, * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas. @@ -238,252 +180,6 @@ mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label); } -int -mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p) -{ - struct label *label; - struct mac mac; - char *buffer; - int error; - - if (mac_p == NULL) - return (0); - - if (!(mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED)) - return (EINVAL); - - error = copyin(mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac)); - if (error) - return (error); - - error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac); - if (error) - return (error); - - buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK); - error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL); - if (error) { - free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); - return (error); - } - - label = mac_cred_label_alloc(); - error = mac_cred_internalize_label(label, buffer); - free(buffer, M_MACTEMP); - if (error) { - mac_cred_label_free(label); - return (error); - } - imgp->execlabel = label; - return (0); -} - -void -mac_execve_exit(struct image_params *imgp) -{ - if (imgp->execlabel != NULL) { - mac_cred_label_free(imgp->execlabel); - imgp->execlabel = NULL; - } -} - -void -mac_execve_interpreter_enter(struct vnode *interpvp, - struct label **interpvplabel) -{ - - if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_VNODE) { - *interpvplabel = mac_vnode_label_alloc(); - mac_vnode_copy_label(interpvp->v_label, *interpvplabel); - } else - *interpvplabel = NULL; -} - -void -mac_execve_interpreter_exit(struct label *interpvplabel) -{ - - if (interpvplabel != NULL) - mac_vnode_label_free(interpvplabel); -} - -/* - * When relabeling a process, call out to the policies for the maximum - * permission allowed for each object type we know about in its memory space, - * and revoke access (in the least surprising ways we know) when necessary. - * The process lock is not held here. - */ -void -mac_proc_vm_revoke(struct thread *td) -{ - struct ucred *cred; - - PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc); - cred = crhold(td->td_proc->p_ucred); - PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc); - - /* XXX freeze all other threads */ - mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(td, cred, - &td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map); - /* XXX allow other threads to continue */ - - crfree(cred); -} - -static __inline const char * -prot2str(vm_prot_t prot) -{ - - switch (prot & VM_PROT_ALL) { - case VM_PROT_READ: - return ("r--"); - case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE: - return ("rw-"); - case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: - return ("r-x"); - case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: - return ("rwx"); - case VM_PROT_WRITE: - return ("-w-"); - case VM_PROT_EXECUTE: - return ("--x"); - case VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE: - return ("-wx"); - default: - return ("---"); - } -} - -static void -mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred, - struct vm_map *map) -{ - struct vm_map_entry *vme; - int vfslocked, result; - vm_prot_t revokeperms; - vm_object_t backing_object, object; - vm_ooffset_t offset; - struct vnode *vp; - struct mount *mp; - - if (!mac_mmap_revocation) - return; - - vm_map_lock_read(map); - for (vme = map->header.next; vme != &map->header; vme = vme->next) { - if (vme->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_IS_SUB_MAP) { - mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(td, cred, - vme->object.sub_map); - continue; - } - /* - * Skip over entries that obviously are not shared. - */ - if (vme->eflags & (MAP_ENTRY_COW | MAP_ENTRY_NOSYNC) || - !vme->max_protection) - continue; - /* - * Drill down to the deepest backing object. - */ - offset = vme->offset; - object = vme->object.vm_object; - if (object == NULL) - continue; - VM_OBJECT_LOCK(object); - while ((backing_object = object->backing_object) != NULL) { - VM_OBJECT_LOCK(backing_object); - offset += object->backing_object_offset; - VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object); - object = backing_object; - } - VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object); - /* - * At the moment, vm_maps and objects aren't considered by - * the MAC system, so only things with backing by a normal - * object (read: vnodes) are checked. - */ - if (object->type != OBJT_VNODE) - continue; - vp = (struct vnode *)object->handle; - vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vp->v_mount); - vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); - result = vme->max_protection; - mac_vnode_check_mmap_downgrade(cred, vp, &result); - VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0); - /* - * Find out what maximum protection we may be allowing now - * but a policy needs to get removed. - */ - revokeperms = vme->max_protection & ~result; - if (!revokeperms) { - VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked); - continue; - } - printf("pid %ld: revoking %s perms from %#lx:%ld " - "(max %s/cur %s)\n", (long)td->td_proc->p_pid, - prot2str(revokeperms), (u_long)vme->start, - (long)(vme->end - vme->start), - prot2str(vme->max_protection), prot2str(vme->protection)); - vm_map_lock_upgrade(map); - /* - * This is the really simple case: if a map has more - * max_protection than is allowed, but it's not being - * actually used (that is, the current protection is still - * allowed), we can just wipe it out and do nothing more. - */ - if ((vme->protection & revokeperms) == 0) { - vme->max_protection -= revokeperms; - } else { - if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_WRITE) { - /* - * In the more complicated case, flush out all - * pending changes to the object then turn it - * copy-on-write. - */ - vm_object_reference(object); - (void) vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT); - vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY); - VM_OBJECT_LOCK(object); - vm_object_page_clean(object, - OFF_TO_IDX(offset), - OFF_TO_IDX(offset + vme->end - vme->start + - PAGE_MASK), - OBJPC_SYNC); - VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object); - VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0); - vn_finished_write(mp); - vm_object_deallocate(object); - /* - * Why bother if there's no read permissions - * anymore? For the rest, we need to leave - * the write permissions on for COW, or - * remove them entirely if configured to. - */ - if (!mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow) { - vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE; - vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE; - } if ((revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) == 0) - vme->eflags |= MAP_ENTRY_COW | - MAP_ENTRY_NEEDS_COPY; - } - if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) { - vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE; - vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE; - } - if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) { - vme->max_protection = 0; - vme->protection = 0; - } - pmap_protect(map->pmap, vme->start, vme->end, - vme->protection & ~revokeperms); - vm_map_simplify_entry(map, vme); - } - vm_map_lock_downgrade(map); - VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked); - } - vm_map_unlock_read(map); -} - /* * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified @@ -515,160 +211,3 @@ mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1 return (error); } - -int -mac_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_debug, cred, p); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_sched, cred, p); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p, int signum) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_signal, cred, p, signum); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_setuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setuid, cred, uid); - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_seteuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_seteuid, cred, euid); - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_setgid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setgid, cred, gid); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_setegid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setegid, cred, egid); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_setgroups(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, int ngroups, - gid_t *gidset) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setgroups, cred, ngroups, gidset); - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_setreuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, - uid_t euid) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setreuid, cred, ruid, euid); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_setregid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, - gid_t egid) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setregid, cred, rgid, egid); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_setresuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid, - uid_t euid, uid_t suid) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setresuid, cred, ruid, euid, suid); - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_setresgid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid, - gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setresgid, cred, rgid, egid, sgid); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_proc_check_wait(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) -{ - int error; - - PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED); - - MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, p); - - return (error); -} Modified: head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c ============================================================================== --- head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c Tue Oct 28 21:05:09 2008 (r184424) +++ head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c Tue Oct 28 21:53:10 2008 (r184425) @@ -84,26 +84,6 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap static void mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map); -struct label * -mac_cred_label_alloc(void) -{ - struct label *label; - - label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK); - MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label); - return (label); -} - -void -mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED) - cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc(); - else - cred->cr_label = NULL; -} - static struct label * mac_proc_label_alloc(void) { @@ -124,24 +104,6 @@ mac_proc_init(struct proc *p) p->p_label = NULL; } -void -mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label); - mac_labelzone_free(label); -} - -void -mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - if (cred->cr_label != NULL) { - mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label); - cred->cr_label = NULL; - } -} - static void mac_proc_label_free(struct label *label) { @@ -160,65 +122,6 @@ mac_proc_destroy(struct proc *p) } } -/* - * When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be - * updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system - * operations originate from the network. - * - * At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS - * RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to - * provide more fine-grained access control. - */ -void -mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred); -} - -/* - * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel - * processes and threads are spawned. - */ -void -mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred); -} - -/* - * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other - * userland processes and threads are spawned. - */ -void -mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred); -} - -int -mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements, - char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen) -{ - int error; - - MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string) -{ - int error; - - MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string); - - return (error); -} - void mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td) { @@ -226,18 +129,6 @@ mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td) MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td); } -/* - * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally, - * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas. - * This function allows that processing to take place. - */ -void -mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label); -} - int mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p) { @@ -484,38 +375,6 @@ mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread vm_map_unlock_read(map); } -/* - * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege - * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified - * buffer cache. - */ -void -mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) -{ - - MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel); -} - -int -mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel) -{ - int error; - - MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel); - - return (error); -} - -int -mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2) -{ - int error; - - MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2); - - return (error); -} - int mac_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p) {
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