Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)
Date:      Wed, 5 Feb 2014 19:56:36 +0000
From:      "Robert N. M. Watson" <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>
To:        John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.org>
Cc:        src-committers@freebsd.org, Doug Ambrisko <ambrisko@ambrisko.com>, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, Gleb Smirnoff <glebius@freebsd.org>, James Gritton <jamie@freebsd.org>, svn-src-head@freebsd.org, Alexander Leidinger <Alexander@leidinger.net>
Subject:   Re: svn commit: r261266 - in head: sys/dev/drm sys/kern sys/sys usr.sbin/jail
Message-ID:  <998DA3CF-C5A2-4492-8DF5-F1BF2451B860@FreeBSD.org>
In-Reply-To: <2362081.WrjYmKeYu9@ralph.baldwin.cx>
References:  <201401291341.s0TDfDcB068211@svn.freebsd.org> <52EC4DBB.50804@freebsd.org> <20140203235336.GA46006@ambrisko.com> <2362081.WrjYmKeYu9@ralph.baldwin.cx>

next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help

On 5 Feb 2014, at 19:05, John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.org> wrote:

> A short term solution that would permit non-security jails without =
having to=20
> do the longer term work that Robert would like might be to add a new =
per-jail=20
> flag that in effect means "no security at all".  You would then modify =
one=20
> place (prison_priv_check() in kern_jail.c) to treat a jail with this =
flag set=20
> as if it wasn't jailed at all.  This would clearly communicate to a =
user what=20
> they were doing by enabling this flag (jail --root-me-please), and it =
would=20
> also avoid future proliferation of new flags to add more optional and =
obscure=20
> holes in jails.

One path to this goal would be to better differentiate the idea of a =
'jail' from a more generic notion of a 'container'. I'm a bit loath to =
use the latter term due to conflicts with the Linux convention which =
uses 'container' to refer to something more like our 'jail', but in many =
ways it would be useful. You could imagine having two variations on the =
jail(8) command: today's jail(8) with security properties, and a new =
container(8) from the same man page, but with only virtualisation, not =
security properties.

In general, there are two objections being raised here, which I think =
you capture well: (1) an architectural concern about appropriate =
implementation and its implications, and (2) appropriate =
presentation/documentation for the user to prevent the significant =
surprise they will get when they turn on an option without understanding =
its implications.

Robert=



Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?998DA3CF-C5A2-4492-8DF5-F1BF2451B860>