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Date:      Sat, 22 Jan 2000 04:03:19 -0800
From:      Don Lewis <Don.Lewis@tsc.tdk.com>
To:        Vladimir Dubrovin <vlad@sandy.ru>, Don Lewis <Don.Lewis@tsc.tdk.com>
Cc:        Tim Yardley <yardley@uiuc.edu>, news@technotronic.com, bugtraq@securityfocus.com, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Re[4]: explanation and code for stream.c issues
Message-ID:  <200001221203.EAA16975@salsa.gv.tsc.tdk.com>
In-Reply-To: <1593.000122@sandy.ru>
References:  <200001221058.CAA16745@salsa.gv.tsc.tdk.com> <1593.000122@sandy.ru>

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On Jan 22,  2:14pm, Vladimir Dubrovin wrote:
} Subject: Re[4]: explanation and code for stream.c issues
} Hello Don Lewis,
} 
} 22.01.00 13:58, you wrote: explanation and code for stream.c issues;
} 
} D> } Intruder sends SYN packet and then sends, lets say 1000 ACK packets to
} D> } the  same port from same port and source address. SYN packet will open
} D> } ipfilter  to  pass  all  others  packets.  This  attack  doesn't  need
} D> } randomization for each packet.
} 
} D> Instead of producing RST responses, this will produce ACKs. Your earlier
} D> comment about this prompted my comment in another thread about the
} D> possible need to rate limit ACK packets.
} 
} This  will  not  produce  ACK packets, if ACK send by intruder doesn't
} conform  sequence  number  in the SYN/ACK response of victim. Original
} stream.c used

  [snip]

} But  it's  not  principial  - victim will reply RST for this packet in
} most cases.

Ok, you are correct.  The attacker would have to guess or sniff the
initial sequence number in order to produce a flood of ACK responses,
so the stack is in better shape than I feared.

I'm getting too tired to really analyze this, but I also think that
repeatedly sending the original SYN (sorry for the pun) won't cause
a flood of responses.  I think the victim will periodically resend the
SYN+ACK packet for which it expects an ACK.


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