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Date:      Sat, 19 Jan 2002 05:35:07 -0800
From:      Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org>
To:        "Andrey A. Chernov" <ache@nagual.pp.ru>
Cc:        Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org>, cvs-committers@FreeBSD.org, cvs-all@FreeBSD.org
Subject:   Re: cvs commit: src/lib/libpam/modules/pam_opie pam_opie.c
Message-ID:  <20020119053506.A77530@xor.obsecurity.org>
In-Reply-To: <20020119124322.GB8776@nagual.pp.ru>; from ache@nagual.pp.ru on Sat, Jan 19, 2002 at 03:43:22PM %2B0300
References:  <200201191009.g0JA95b91076@freefall.freebsd.org> <20020119042808.A67985@xor.obsecurity.org> <20020119123903.GA8776@nagual.pp.ru> <20020119124322.GB8776@nagual.pp.ru>

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On Sat, Jan 19, 2002 at 03:43:22PM +0300, Andrey A. Chernov wrote:

> > > Wait a minute..was this discussed anywhere?
> >=20
> > We already live with this "change" several years when S/Key was here and
> > nobody complaints. This is not a change, this is return to old way as it
> > must be.
> >=20
> > This change have nothing common to security, just eliminate obscurity.

There were two points I made in my email:

1) This particular change is debatable; there are certainly other
possible ways to fix the information leak about nonexistent user
names.  For example, regenerate a random seed once a week so the fake
challenges only change slowly over time, as they would if the user was
real.  Anyway, my main point was:

2) If you don't fully understand the PAM code, as you admitted in an
earlier email, then it's surely very easy to introduce inadvertent
security vulnerabilities, and you should be a responsible enough
programmer to solicit review without me having to tell you to.

All PAM commits should be reviewed by a PAM-knowledgeable committer;
this shouldn't be open to debate since it's pure common sense.

In case the point needs further reinforcing, I can't think of a single
security vulnerability in recent history which was introduced into
FreeBSD by a committer who had the change reviewed; they've all been
made by people who committed the code on their own without a review.

Kris

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