Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2005 22:15:00 -0500 From: Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org> To: Matt Emmerton <matt@gsicomp.on.ca> Cc: Barney Wolff <barney@databus.com>, freebsd-current@freebsd.org, Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org>, Sean Bryant <sean@cyberwang.net> Subject: Re: fetch extension - use local filename from content-disposition header Message-ID: <20051229221459.A17102@cons.org> In-Reply-To: <023f01c60cee$668f60a0$1200a8c0@gsicomp.on.ca>; from matt@gsicomp.on.ca on Thu, Dec 29, 2005 at 10:09:03PM -0500 References: <20051229193328.A13367@cons.org> <20051230021602.GA9026@pit.databus.com><43B498DF.4050204@cyberwang.net> <43B49B22.7040307@gmail.com> <023f01c60cee$668f60a0$1200a8c0@gsicomp.on.ca>
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Matt Emmerton wrote on Thu, Dec 29, 2005 at 10:09:03PM -0500: > > Sean Bryant wrote: > > > Barney Wolff wrote: > > > > > >> On Thu, Dec 29, 2005 at 07:33:38PM -0500, Martin Cracauer wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >>> I'm a bit rusty, so please point me to style mistakes in the appended > > >>> diff. > > >>> The following diff implements a "-O" option to fetch(1), which, when > > >>> set, will make fetch use a local filename supplied by the server in a > > >>> Content-Disposition header. > > >>> > > >> > > >> Have you considered the security implications of this option? > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > Its just an extra option. I'm sure the details could be summed up in the > > > man page. > > > > I think what Barney means is that if you run fetch(1) as root and the > > server returns the filename as "/sbin/init" bad things will happen. > > The data returned in Content-Disposition should be used with caution. > > Would checking to see if the target file exists, and if so, abort the > operation and display a warning be sufficient to address the security > issues? Of course, we'd need some kind of "force" option to override this > for the foot-shooting folks, and -f is already taken, but that could easily > be documented as a "limitation" of this option. I don't like it since it derives too much from standard behavior which is to use a local name derived from the URL, even if it exists. Also, not overwriting files doesn't cut it for security, you could e.g. create a nonexisting .rhosts or .ssh/authorized_keys or play similar games. Forbidding "/" will set the security to the same level as the base functionality. I like that. Martin -- %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Martin Cracauer <cracauer@cons.org> http://www.cons.org/cracauer/ FreeBSD - where you want to go, today. http://www.freebsd.org/
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