Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2011 07:40:56 +1100 From: Peter Jeremy <peterjeremy@acm.org> To: Miguel Lopes Santos Ramos <mbox@miguel.ramos.name> Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: It's not possible to allow non-OPIE logins only from trusted networks Message-ID: <20110313204054.GA5392@server.vk2pj.dyndns.org> In-Reply-To: <1299798547.20831.59.camel@w500.local> References: <1299682310.17149.24.camel@w500.local> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1103100147350.1891@qvfongpu.qngnvk.ybpny> <1299769253.20266.23.camel@w500.local> <2E5C0CE8-4F70-4A4D-A91D-3274FD394C80@elvandar.org> <1299784361.18199.4.camel@w500.local> <20110310202653.GG9421@shame.svkt.org> <1299798547.20831.59.camel@w500.local>
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--tKW2IUtsqtDRztdT Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 2011-Mar-10 23:09:07 +0000, Miguel Lopes Santos Ramos <mbox@miguel.ramos= =2Ename> wrote: >- The objection on S/KEY on that wiki page, that it's possible to >compute all previous passwords, is a bit odd, since past passwords won't >be used anymore. One weakness of S/KEY and OPIE is that if an attacker finds the password (response) for sequence N then they can trivially determine the response for any sequence > N. This could occur if (eg) you have a printout of OPIE keys and are just crossing them off (which was a common recommendation prior to smart phones etc) - an attacker just needs to memorise the lowest N and response. --=20 Peter Jeremy --tKW2IUtsqtDRztdT Content-Type: application/pgp-signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAk19K9YACgkQ/opHv/APuIcnugCfYPfTapafPzGfhZJGD5eP/Otu k5kAmwWfDI481VUuKfo6LDXin3YsgLF8 =Fo0q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --tKW2IUtsqtDRztdT--
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