Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2006 00:07:02 +0300 (EEST) From: Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-06:22.openssh Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0610010004370.4488@netcore.fi> In-Reply-To: <200609302024.k8UKOjon073315@freefall.freebsd.org> References: <200609302024.k8UKOjon073315@freefall.freebsd.org>
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On Sat, 30 Sep 2006, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote: > III. Impact > > An attacker sending specially crafted packets to sshd(8) can cause a > Denial of Service by using 100% of CPU time until a connection timeout > occurs. Since this attack can be performed over multiple connections > simultaneously, it is possible to cause up to MaxStartups (10 by default) > sshd processes to use all the CPU time they can obtain. [CVE-2006-4924] > > The OpenSSH project believe that the race condition can lead to a Denial > of Service or potentially remote code execution, but the FreeBSD Security > Team has been unable to verify the exact impact. [CVE-2006-5051] > > IV. Workaround > > The attack against the CRC compensation attack detector can be avoided > by disabling SSH Protocol version 1 support in sshd_config(5). > > There is no workaround for the second issue. Doesn't TCP wrappers restriction mitigate or work around this issue or is it done too late ? -- Pekka Savola "You each name yourselves king, yet the Netcore Oy kingdom bleeds." Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings
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